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Hurricane Harvey from space August 24, 2017 (Image courtesy of NASA) 
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Members of FEMA's Urban Search and Rescue Nebraska Task Force One perform one of many water 
rescues in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey (Image courtesy FEMA News photo). 
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31 August 2017, extensive flooding in a residential area in Southeast Texas (Image courtesy: Air National 
Guard - Staff Sgt. Daniel J Martinez) 
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Preface 
The Netherlands and the U.S. share many important bonds, one of which is our relationship to 
water. The Dutch aided New Orleans and New York during the Hurricane Katrina and 
Superstorm Sandy recoveries, and continue to collaborate on water challenges in Miami, 
Norfolk, Boston, San Francisco, St. Louis, and Galveston. In turn, the Dutch learn from the U.S. 
more about emergency management and disaster response.  
  
Climate change adds two crucial dimensions – uncertainty and extremes – to this work, both in 
the U.S. and in the Netherlands. We both must prepare for sea-level rise, and adapt our cities to 
extreme precipitation and water scarcity in our natural landscapes, farms and aquifers. Indeed, 
in the Netherlands we wonder whether our future holds the severe droughts recently 
experienced in the Western United States, or the whipsaw flood-and-drought water levels in the 
Mississippi River in 2011 and 2012. 
 
Collaboration is useful, even necessary, to make us smarter and more resilient, separately and 
collectively. For example, faculty, researchers and students at Delft University of Technology 
have been working closely with Texas A&M University at Galveston and Rice University since 
Hurricane Ike in 2008. This international team of dedicated professionals has enhanced our 
technical and academic understanding of water forces along the Texas coast and around 
Galveston Bay. They have jointly developed a workable, cost-effective solution to coastal 
flooding in those regions. 
 
System-wide, watershed-based approaches, comprehensive risk assessment and integrated 
planning are the foundation of Dutch water management policies, and they are relevant to the 
U.S., too. Hurricane Harvey gives us an opportunity to explore how extreme rainfall has 
impacted America’s fourth largest city, how smart recovery will prepare Houston for future risks, 
and what lessons from Harvey – in flood protection design and operation, risks to human life, 
economic and critical infrastructure, and emergency management – are applicable to the 
Netherlands. 
 
Part of that exploration is the Harvey Hackathon, the results of which are found in the following 
pages. While this report is interim, the breakdown of Harvey and its impacts upon the water 
system, residents, industry, and critical infrastructure in Houston form a solid foundation upon 
which to build. Assessments of the emergency response during Harvey provide key lessons for 
Dutch policymakers and practitioners. The report’s Main Findings should be required reading for 
anyone wanting to understand Harvey and provide a direction of the way forward. The report 
also posits areas for fruitful joint-research that will benefit policymakers, planners and 
technicians in both countries. 
 
Henry Ford noted that “Coming together is a beginning; keeping together is progress; working 
together is success.” I commend TU Delft, its faculty and student body for demonstrating 
through the Harvey Hackathon and the Delta Infrastructures and Mobility Initiative the crucial 
relevance of international collaborative research. Your actions prove that “working together is 
success.” 
 
 
 
 
Henne Schuwer 
Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the US 
  
Dale Morris 
Senior Economist 
Royal Netherlands Embassy 
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Houston Interstate 10 floods during hurricane Harvey, August 28 (Image courtesy Katharine Anarde) 
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Executive Summary  
On August 25, 2017, Hurricane Harvey made landfall near Rockport, Texas as a Category 4 
hurricane with maximum sustained winds of approximately 200 km/hour. Harvey caused severe 
damages in coastal Texas due to extreme winds and storm surge, but will go down in history for 
record-setting rainfall totals and flood-related damages. Across large portions of southeast 
Texas, rainfall totals during the six-day period between August 25 and 31, 2017 were amongst 
the highest ever recorded, causing flooding at an unprecedented scale. More than 100,000 
residential properties are estimated to have been affected in southeast Texas. It is likely that 
Harvey will rank among the costliest storms in U.S. history. 
 
In the wake of Hurricane Harvey, Delft University of Technology has initiated a Harvey 
Research Team to undertake a coordinated multidisciplinary investigation of the events with a 
focus on the greater Houston area. This ‘fact-finding’ research is based on information available 
from public sources during and in the first weeks after the event. Results are therefore 
preliminary, but aim to provide insight into lessons that can be learned for both Texas and the 
Netherlands. As part of the investigations, a hackathon with more than 80 participants was 
organized to collect and analyze available public information. 
 
Houston was especially hard hit by flooding. During the event, all 22 watersheds in the greater 
Houston area experienced flooding. Many of Houston’s creeks and bayous exceeded their 
channel capacities, reaching water levels never before recorded. Across large portions of Harris 
County, rainfall totals exceeded the 1000-year return period. In addition, the water from the two 
reservoirs protecting downtown Houston (Addicks and Barker) were opened on August 28 to 
prevent catastrophic damages to the dams and further flooding in upstream communities. The 
releases exacerbated flooding in the areas downstream of the dams and an estimated 4,000 
homes in neighborhoods downstream of the dams were impacted by flooding.  
 
The consequences of the event in the greater Houston area have been characterized in terms 
of economic damages, loss of life and impacts on critical infrastructure, airports and industry. In 
total, more than 100,000 homes were affected more than 70 fatalities were reported in the 
greater Houston area. The event highlighted the vulnerability of industrial facilities, as several 
cascading impacts (releases of toxic materials and explosions) were reported.  
 
Emergency response has been assessed. No large-scale mandatory evacuation was ordered 
before or during Harvey. However, it appeared that several local evacuations were ordered for 
areas with specific risks and circumstances. During the event, many people were trapped by 
rising waters necessitating a major rescue operation. In total, more than 10,000 rescues were 
made by professional and volunteer rescuers. Social media played an important role during the 
event and recovery, as an additional source of information, to inform  emergency managers and 
as a means to organize community response e.g. for clean-up. Also, messages were conveyed 
through social media, e.g. a report of a levee breach that appeared to be incorrect afterwards. 
 
Major flooding is a problem that has multiple causes from both physical and social origin. Based 
on the investigations, recommendations for future research and lessons for flood management 
have been formulated. A better understanding of the issues studied in this report is expected to 
contribute to a knowledge basis for further in-depth investigations and future directions for flood 
risk reduction. 
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Army Sgt. speaks with a family in Orange, TX, after assisting a local to safety. (Image courtesy: US Army, 
photo by Spc. Austin T. Boucher).  
 
 
TU Delft - Hurricane Harvey Report            Page 13 
 
Acronyms 
ARC  American Red Cross 
BFE  Base Flood Elevation 
CDEMA  Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency 
CDT  Central Daylight Time (CDT = GMT - 5 hours) 
CEG  Civil Engineering and Geosciences 
CMS  Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
CSR  Corporate Social Responsibility 
CTBS  Center for Texas Beaches and Shores 
DG ECHO  Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid 
DoD  Department of Defense 
DoE  Department of Energy 
DoT  Department of Transportation 
ERCC   European Response and Coordination Center  
EPA  Environmental Protection Agency 
FAS  Flood Alert System 
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Association 
FIRM  Flood Insurance Rate Map 
FWS  Flood Warning System 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product  
GLO  General Land Office 
HCFCD  Harris County Flood Control District 
HCFWS Harris County Flood Warning System 
HCOEM Harris County Office of Emergency Management 
HHS  Department of Human Health Services 
HOU  William P. Hobby Airport  
HUD  Department of Housing and Urban Development 
IAH  George Bush Intercontinental Airport Houston 
IMAT  Incident Management Assistance Team 
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
LID  Levee Improvement District 
LIDAR  Laser Imaging Detection And Ranging 
MSL  Mean Sea Level 
MUD  Municipal Utility District 
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NAVD  North American Vertical Datum 
NFIP  National Flood Insurance Program 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organizations 
NHC  National Hurricane Center 
NOAA  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NPL  National Priority List 
NRCC  National Response Coordination Center  
NWS  National Weather Service 
SBA  Small Business Administration 
SBTF  Standby Task Force 
SFHA  Special Flood Hazard Area 
SSPEED Severe Storm Prediction, Education, and Evacuation from Disaster Center 
TCEQ  Texas Commission on Environmental Quality 
 
 
TU Delft - Hurricane Harvey Report            Page 14 
 
TMC   Texas Medical Center 
TSARP  Tropical Storm Allison Recovery Project 
TWC  Texas Workforce Commission 
TXDoT  Texas Department of Transportation 
ULI  Urban Land Institute 
USACE  United States Army Corps of Engineers 
USAR  Urban Search And Rescue 
USDA  United States Department of Agriculture  
USGS  United States Geological Survey 
VFW  Veterans of Foreign Wars 
  
 
 
TU Delft - Hurricane Harvey Report            Page 15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
 
 
 
 
1.1. Context 
 
On August 25, 2017, Hurricane Harvey made landfall as a Category 4 hurricane near Rockport, 
Texas. Harvey’s extreme winds and storm surge caused devastation along the Texas coast. As 
Harvey moved slowly inland, meteorologists predicted that Harvey would drop between 900-
1000 mm (35-40 in) of rain during the following week in coastal Texas. In some areas these 
expectations were exceeded, particularly in the greater Houston area. As a result, 
unprecedented flooding occurred over an area the size of the Netherlands. Houston, the fourth 
largest city in the U.S., was especially hard hit, prompting massive emergency response 
ranging from local grass-roots efforts to formal disaster management. Initial reports place the 
damages from Hurricane Harvey among the top five historical events in the United States. More 
than 20,000 people were forced to seek emergency shelter during the event and an estimated 
120,000 structures have been affected by flooding.  
 
Extreme flood events such as Harvey are tragic, but also very rare events. As such they are 
important opportunities to learn. Therefore, it has been decided to set up an interdisciplinary 
research team at Delft University of Technology (from here on referred to as TU Delft) to 
conduct research in response to Hurricane Harvey. Similar but smaller-scale and more 
disciplinary efforts have been initiated by TU Delft after other flood disasters, such as Hurricane 
Katrina (2005), river floods in Thailand (2011) and Germany (2013) and the tsunami in Japan 
(2012).  
 
Another reason to set up this investigation was the fact that TU Delft has been involved in 
multidisciplinary research and design efforts in Texas since the year 2012 – see textbox 1.1 for 
more information. 
  
1 
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Textbox 1.1: The ‘Texas Case’ 
 
   
The ‘Texas Case’: Flood Risk Reduction in the Houston-Galveston Bay Region 
Since 2012, numerous faculty, staff and students from different faculties and departments at TU Delft 
have been involved in research and design in Texas with a specific focus on the Houston – Galveston 
Bay area. In collaboration with academic partners from Texas  - Texas A&M University and Rice 
University – research has focused on several themes related to flood risk reduction in Galveston Bay, 
including civil infrastructure design, land use and urban planning, governance and coastal engineering. 
For example, civil engineers from TU Delft were involved in the initial design of the coastal spine (or 
‘Ike Dike’) for the protection of the area against storm surge. Students have also been involved in 
investigations into the preliminary designs for a proposed storm surge barriers in the Bolivar Roads 
and Houston Ship Channel, multi-functional land barriers, and nature-based solutions to reduce wind 
setup in Galveston Bay. Some designs were made in collaboration with experts from the Dutch private 
and public sector (Royal HaskoningDHV, IV Infra, Defacto and Rijkswaterstaat).  
 
As part of the multidisciplinary efforts, several courses and workshops have been organized at TU 
Delft. For example, a multi-disciplinary Delta Interventions Studio hosted within the Faculty of 
Architecture brought together students from the departments of hydraulic engineering, urban planning 
and policy analysis. Additionally, in the Contested Issues Game Structuring (CIGaS) workshops 
brought researchers from The Netherlands and Texas together with a wide range of stakeholders to 
assess local values and interests as a basis for future strategies for Galveston Bay.  
 
Since the year 2015, TU Delft has also participated as a partner institution in the Coastal Flood Risk 
Reduction Program, an International Research and Education Program (PIRE) funded by the U.S.’ 
National Science Foundation (NSF) (PI: Dr. Samuel Brody). As part of this multi-million dollar program, 
each summer 15 to 20 U.S. students are given the opportunity to travel to The Netherlands to conduct 
place-based research comparing Dutch and Texas flood risk reduction measures and strategies – 
creating a basis for further research and collaboration between the partner institutions.  
 
The success of our collaboration with Texas over the past five years is perhaps best summarized by 
the following figures: 25+ MSc theses; 12 faculty research projects; 7 technical reports; 1 book and 2 
book sections; 3 PhD exchanges; 10+ faculty-exchange visits; 15+ collaborative workshops, symposia 
and seminars. In addition, the Texas case is included in three Dutch National Science Foundation 
(NWO) research programs in which TU Delft is involved. Interim results of the exchange and research 
have been summarized in the publication “Delft Delta Design: the Houston Galveston Bay Region, 
Texas, USA” (Kothuis et al., 2015). 
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1.2. Objective 
Hurricane Harvey resulted in widespread, never-before-seen flooding across Houston and 
surrounding areas. This report attempts gives an overview of Harvey’s impacts in the region, 
while also focusing on several ‘hot spots’: locations that have experienced damage from 
flooding during recent flood events. At these hot spots, Harvey’s extreme weather caused 
significant flooding, damages to housing and/or industry, human impacts (e.g., evacuations) 
and/or casualties. The events are studied from a multi-disciplinary perspective, considering the 
specializations of hydraulic structures, flood management, emergency response, safety and 
security and urban planning. To facilitate this research, first, a ‘fact finding’ investigation was 
undertaken during and in the immediate aftermath of the event (4-8 weeks).  
 
The ‘fact finding’ includes efforts to collect data and information on the meteorology, the 
hydrologic and hydraulic response of the system, the emergency management and disaster 
response, and the impacts of the event on critical and hydraulic infrastructure. The Harvey 
Hackathon (Chapter 7), activating over a hundred students and researchers from multiple 
disciplines in a full day flash-event to gather data on the hurricane and its impact, was helpful to 
collect a large batch of initial information creating first insights on Harvey’s effects and sprouting 
multiple questions for further academic research. This report constitutes the results of the ‘fact 
finding’. It aims to provide a basis for longer-term research focusing on specific research topics 
more in-depth and to provide a basis for “research by design” for flood risk reduction in the 
affected areas. 
 
 
1.3. Reading Guide 
This report contains a description of Harvey’s storm characteristics (Chapter 2), and a brief 
overview of Houston and its relationship to flooding (Chapter 3). This is followed by a 
description of Harvey’s flood impacts in Houston and its surrounding areas (Chapter 4), 
damages and fatalities caused by flooding (Chapter 5), emergency decision-making and 
response (Chapter 6) and the data collection event Harvey Hackathon  (Chapter 7).  Finally, 
Chapter 8 describes the main findings, future research needs and lessons learned from the 
event.  
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Hurricane Harvey making landfall in Texas, August 25, 2017 (Image courtesy: NASA).  
 
 
TU Delft - Hurricane Harvey Report            Page 19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hurricane Harvey  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1. Hurricane Formation  
Tropical cyclones form over the tropical latitudes where sea surface temperatures exceed 27 
degrees Celsius. The hot waters cause water to evaporate and as the warm air rises, it cools 
and condenses, fueling the formation of clouds and thunderstorms. This process releases latent 
energy, causing the surrounding air to become even warmer, additional evaporation, and the 
atmospheric pressure at the sea surface to drop. Westerly winds blow toward the storm while 
the earth rotates clockwise, causing the thunderstorms to rotate counter-clockwise around the 
low pressure center called the eye (Figure 2.1).  
 
  
 
 
Figure 2.1. Formation of a tropical cyclone. (Courtesy of NASA) 
 
2 
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In the Atlantic Ocean, the hurricane season begins on June 1st and lasts until November 30th. 
The number of storms varies significantly each season; however, the intensity and number of 
storms in the Gulf of Mexico typically peaks in August and September each year. NOAA 
estimates that in the Houston-Galveston region, the approximate return period of a tropical 
cyclone is once every 9 years and a major hurricane (Category 3 or higher) is once every 25-26 
years (NHC, 2015). The last major hurricane to make landfall on the Texas coast was Hurricane 
Celia (Category 3) in 1970 and the most recent hurricane to affect the Houston Galveston 
region was Hurricane Ike (Category 2) on September 13, 2008.  
 
The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale was originally developed in 1974 (and updated in 
2010) as a tool to alert the public to a storm’s probable impact (Table 1). The scale uses wind 
velocity to categorize a hurricane’s potential damage on a scale from 1 to 5 – where a rating of 
five indicates that the storm will cause catastrophic damage to coastal infrastructure (Schott et 
al. 2012). In addition to damage from winds, tropical cyclones have the potential to cause 
devastating coastal flooding. Storm surge is generated when the low atmospheric pressure 
associated with a tropical cyclone causes sea levels to rise. In addition, along mildly sloped 
coasts and in coastal bays, local wind conditions can contribute to even higher set up. The 
highest storm surge are typically located in the northeast quadrant of the storm at the radius 
maximum winds, which is the location of the hurricane’s eyewall and most destructive winds.  
 
Table 2.1. Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale (NHC n.d.) 
 
Category 
Sustained Winds1 
(km/h) 
Anticipated Wind Damage 
1 119-153 
Very dangerous winds will produce some damage: Well-constructed frame homes 
could have damage to roof, shingles, vinyl siding and gutters. Extensive damage to 
power lines and poles likely will result in power outages that could last a few to 
several days. 
2 154-177 
Extremely dangerous winds will cause extensive damage: Well-constructed frame 
homes could sustain major roof and siding damage. Near-total power loss is expected 
with outages that could last from several days to weeks. 
3 
(major) 
178-208 
Devastating damage will occur: Well-built framed homes may incur major damage or 
removal of roof decking and gable ends. Electricity and water will be unavailable for 
several days to weeks after the storm passes. 
4 
(major) 
209-251 
Catastrophic damage will occur: Well-built framed homes can sustain severe damage 
with loss of most of the roof structure and/or some exterior walls. Most trees will be 
snapped or uprooted and power poles downed. Most of the area will be uninhabitable 
for weeks or months. 
5 
(major) 
>252 
Catastrophic damage will occur: A high percentage of framed homes will be 
destroyed, with total roof failure and wall collapse. Most of the area will be 
uninhabitable for weeks or months. 
 
 
2.2. Hurricane Harvey 
Harvey first developed as a low pressure system just east of the Lesser Antilles on August 17, 
2017. It briefly became a tropical cyclone as it crossed the Caribbean before degenerating into 
a tropical wave over the Yucatan Peninsula on August 18. By Wednesday, August 23, Harvey 
had regenerated into a tropical depression and hurricane and storm surge watches were 
initiated for parts of the Texas coast. Initial forecasts had Harvey heading for mid-Texas coast, 
somewhere near San Luis Pass, Texas, however with weakening wind shear in the Gulf of 
Mexico, Harvey intensified and shifted further south. On August 24, 2017 Harvey strengthened 
                                                       
1 Sustained winds are the highest one minute surface wind occurring within the system (Powell et al. 1996).  
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into a Category 1 hurricane. As Hurricane Harvey approached the Texas coast, unusually warm 
water in the Gulf of Mexico further fueled the storm’s development. Harvey intensified 
substantially in the final hours before landfall, strengthening into a Category 4 hurricane with 
maximum sustained winds around 209 km/h (130 mph).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Hurricane Harvey’s track 
 
Harvey made landfall at approximately 10:00 PM CDT (0300 UTC) on Friday August 25, 2017 
at the northern end of San Jose Island about 6 km (4 miles) east of Rockport (NHC). At landfall, 
hurricane force winds extended approximately 65 km (40 miles) and tropical storm force winds 
extended outward approximately 220 km (140 miles) (Figure 2.3). Peak wind gusts of up to 212 
km/h (132 mph) were reported near Port Aransas, Texas (NWS 2017). The highest storm surge 
was recorded in the coastal bays to the east of Harvey’s landfall location: Corpus Christi Bay, 
Copano Bay, and San Antonio Bay, where total water levels exceeded 2 meters. The highest 
total water level was recorded at the Aransas Wildlife Refuge, where storm tide reached 3.7 m 
(12 ft).  
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Figure 2.3. Hurricane Harvey making landfall near Rockport, Texas at approximately 1000 PM CDT on 
Friday August 25, 2017 as a Category 4 hurricane (NWS).  
 
Upon landfall, Harvey’s Category 4 winds passed right over the city of Rockport exposing the 
small town to the strongest winds inside the storms eyewall. Many structures and residences in 
Rockport and surrounding areas were damaged or destroyed, and tens of thousands of south 
Texans lost power for days with the most severely impacted areas losing power for weeks. In 
addition, many areas lost access to clean drinking water because the local water treatment 
plant was closed due to the power outage.  
 
      
 
Figure 2.4. (a) Damages in Rockport, Texas were primarily wind and surge driven, whereas (b) damages 
in Houston were driven by extreme precipitation. (Images courtesy of (a) FEMA - Dominick Del Vecchio 
and (b) www.defense.gov) 
 
Harvey continued to move inland at approximately 11 km/h (7 mph), and was expected to slow 
considerably in the coming days, hovering over southeastern Texas and bringing catastrophic 
rainfall and life-threatening flooding to Houston and surrounding areas. Heavy rainfall of 380 to 
760 mm (15 to 30 in) was forecasted, with isolated rainfall totals as high as 1270 mm (50 in)  
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through the following Thursday, August 31, 2017. By August 30, 2017, more than 635 mm (25 
in.) of rain had fallen over southeast Texas with isolated observations of more than 1016 mm 
(40 in.) in 48 hours in the Houston Galveston area (Figure 2.5). The highest recorded rainfall 
totals in U.S. history occurred in Cedar Bayou in Southeast Texas where a total of 1318 mm 
(51.88 in) of rain fell during the storm (NWS 2017). The remainder of this report focuses on 
impacts to Houston and the surrounding areas. It is important to point out that significant 
flooding and damages due to heavy rainfall also occurred in other areas of Texas, e.g., 
Beaumont; however, this is not substantially covered in this report. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5. 7-day cumulative precipitation totals (in inches) for Hurricane Harvey as of August 30, 2017 
(NWS 2017) 
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Flooded residential area, Woodland Heights, Houston, August 28, 2017 (Image courtesy Mike 
Burcham).   
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Flood Management  
in Houston, Texas 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Houston is the 4th largest city in the United States with an estimated population of 2.3 million 
people. The City of Houston is located in Harris County and is part of a greater metropolitan 
region spanning eight counties (Brazoria, Chambers, Fort Bend, Galveston, Harris, Liberty, 
Montgomery, and Waller) (Figure 3.1). The entire region is home to an estimated 6.4 million 
people and is expected to grow to 10 million people by 2040 (HGAC 2016).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Greater metropolitan Houston spanning eight counties.   
3 
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The regional economy is driven by the energy, healthcare, biomedical research, and aerospace 
sectors. The gross domestic product (GDP) of the Houston metropolitan region was $503 billion 
USD in 2015, which accounts for about 3% of the national GDP (Rodriguez et al. 2016). In 
addition, Houston lays claim to the largest medical center in the world – The Texas Medical 
Center – and the largest petrochemical complex and foreign port in the U.S. – The Port of 
Houston.  
 
In Houston, flooding is never a matter of ‘if’, but only ‘when’. Intense rainfalls, characteristic of 
the Gulf of Mexico and brought about by tropical cyclones or strong convective systems, have 
the potential to drop extreme rainfall over the region. The average annual rainfall in Houston is 
1264 mm (49.77 in), and it is not uncommon to receive a significant percentage of this rainfall 
during a single event. Houston is characterized by clay soils and little topographic relief, 
creating wide and shallow floodplains. In its natural state, the region would be covered by 
wetlands and coastal prairie that have the ability to absorb and store floodwaters, slowly 
releasing them into small creeks and bayous: small, tidally influenced rivers, which are fed by 
rainfall-runoff and act as the primary drainage system for the region (Figure 3.2).  
 
In addition, Houston’s location on the edge of Galveston Bay also makes it vulnerable to 
inundation from storm surge during extreme wind events. To date, the Galveston Hurricane of 
1900 remains the highest recorded storm surge in the region, with observed storm surge 
exceeding 4.5 meters on Galveston Island. A number of small protection systems have been 
built in the wake of historical events, including the Galveston Seawall (1902), the Texas City 
Dike (1915) and Levee (1962), and the Freeport Levee System (1962), but no regional system 
currently exists to protect Houston or surrounding areas from storm surge. Moreover, elevated 
water levels in the bay also have the potential to exacerbate inland flooding by preventing runoff 
from entering Galveston Bay. Previous research has indicated that backwater from storm surge 
could influence water levels as far inland as downtown Houston.  
 
Figure 3.2. Watershed map by Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD)  
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3.2. Riverine Flood Control 
Houston was founded in 1836 at the confluence of Buffalo and White Oak Bayous and early 
settlers lived directly on the banks of the Houston Ship Channel. However, severe floods in 
1929 and 1935 immediately highlighted the city’s vulnerability to flooding (HCFCD n.d.). This 
prompted the creation of the Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD), which later became 
the local cost-share partner and regional counterpart to the USACE, and charged it with 
evaluated the hydrologic response of the region and designing flood protection for the City of 
Houston. With more than 1,500 bayous and creeks within the county totaling approximately 
4023 km (2500 mi) in length, the HCFCD is responsible for devising flood risk reduction plans, 
implementing them, and monitoring and maintaining infrastructure.  
 
To alleviate flooding in downtown Houston, the HCFCD, together with the USACE, designed 
and built two flood control reservoirs in the upstream portion of the Buffalo Bayou watershed, 
west of downtown Houston. The two reservoirs, Addicks and Barker, were completed in 1945 
and 1948, respectively. Several small creeks feed the reservoirs during normal events and 
Addicks also holds overflows from Cypress Creek during extreme events. The dams consist of 
earthen levees with a total height of 37 meters2 (Addicks) and 34 meters (Barker) and are 
equipped with flow gates to release water into Buffalo Bayou. In addition, they have been 
retrofitted with concrete-armored auxiliary spillways at the upstream ends of the dams to 
prevent water from overtopping or eroding the earthen embankments (Figure 3.3). Other dams 
in the greater Houston area, such as the dam at Lake Conroe, serve similar purposes. 
 
   
Figure 3.3. Diagram depicting Addicks and Barker reservoirs and their location relative to Houston.  
 
At the time of construction, Addicks and Barker were built on government property. Since then, 
residential development has encroached into the storage areas within the reservoirs’ footprints 
and previous floods have increased sedimentation in the reservoirs, reducing their total storage 
capacity. According to the USACE, the reservoirs can still hold a 100-year flood event within the 
boundaries of the government-owned land (Tang and Neil 2017). In addition to a reduction in 
storage capacity of the reservoirs, urban areas downstream of the dam were constructed along 
Buffalo Bayou increasing the potential risks if the dams were to fail or if significant releases 
were to occur.  
 
In recent years, both Addicks and Barker have received considerable attention after the USACE 
announced that they are “extremely high risk.” Inspections revealed cracks and voids in and 
                                                       
2 All water levels are reported relative to NAVD88 unless otherwise noted. 
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under the dams and the USACE identified six critical failure modes. It was estimated that 
property damages downstream of the dams could reach $22.7 billion USD (19 billion euro) and 
an estimated 6,928 people would be affected by life-threatening flooding (Caruba 2016). The 
USACE allocated $72 million USD to repair and reinforce the reservoirs; renovations began in 
2012 and are on-going. 
 
With the expansion of urban areas into the upstream portions of Houston’s watersheds also 
came the need for regional flood control strategies. Houston and surrounding areas 
experienced rapid urban growth during the 1960s and 70s. To offset its impact and to allow for 
development and economic growth in previously flood-prone areas, many of Houston’s primary 
waterways were channelized, including Brays, White Oak, and Greens Bayous. These 
channelization projects involved widening, deepening, and straightening the bayous, and in 
some places adding a concrete-liner to increase flow velocities and more quickly evacuate flood 
waters (Figure 3.4). While this decreased the extent of the floodplain at the time, it has 
exacerbated flooding in these watersheds over the long term as urban development has 
increasingly led to higher runoff volumes and stages in downstream areas (Sebastian, 2016; 
Sebastian and Gori, 2018). Today, it is estimated that some of Houston’s bayous can only 
accommodate a 10-year rainfall event (Schaper 2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Typical cross-section of a modified channel in Houston 
 
To manage overland flooding in urban areas, storm water systems consisting of concrete pipes 
and – in older neighborhoods – roadside ditches are used to route water into the creeks and 
bayous. At a minimum, these systems are designed to handle the 5- to 10-year 24-hour rainfall 
totals. For larger storm events, the street network acts as a secondary drainage system. In 
addition, there are several large on-going structural projects in Harris County, including Sims 
Bayou Federal Flood Damage Reduction Project, Greens Bayou Federal Flood Risk 
Management Project, and Brays Bayou Federal Flood Damage Reduction Project (Project 
Brays), aimed at reducing the impacts of flooding in the watersheds. There are also several 
examples of successful buyout programs in which flood prone neighborhoods have been 
converted into detention areas, including the Bretshire, Hall Park Stormwater, and Mud Gully 
Stormwater Detention Basins.  
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3.3. The Role of the National Flood Insurance Program 
In 1968, the U.S. federal government enacted the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). 
The NFIP was intended to offset the need for federal disaster relief after major flood events and 
encourage floodplain management in participating communities. To participate, communities 
were required to identify the areas that can be reasonably expected to flood during a 1% event, 
i.e., the ‘100-year floodplain’ or ‘Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs)’ (Figure 3.5). Thus, the 
100-year floodplain became the primary marker of flood risk in the United States, driving where 
development can take place and decisions regarding household and community flood mitigation 
(Brody et al. 2015). For example, under the NFIP, homeowners with federally-backed 
mortgages living within the SFHAs are required to buy federal flood insurance and those living 
outside can buy insurance on a voluntary basis. In addition, structures built in the floodplain are 
required to be elevated at or above the base flood elevation (BFE) associated with the 100-year 
flood; the amount of freeboard above the BFE is determined on a community-by-community 
basis.  
 
  
 
Figure 3.5. Current floodplains for Harris County, Houston; showing the 100-year (light blue), 500 year 
(light green), floodplains along the floodways (dark blue) and coastal floodplains (orange). Courtesy of 
HCFCD.  
 
The City of Houston has been a member of the NFIP since 1974, with surrounding communities 
joining shortly thereafter. However, despite 43 years and millions of dollars of investments in 
flood risk reduction, Harris County still experiences the highest rate of repetitive flood losses in 
the country (Conrad et al. 1998; Highfield et al. 2013). As of June 30, 2017, the total insured 
damages in Harris County exceeded $3 billion USD (FEMA 2017a), a large percentage of which 
fell outside of the mapped floodplain areas. This has raised many questions as to the use of the 
100-year floodplains as a marker of risk and the accuracy of the hydrologic and hydraulic 
models used to map them (Blessing et al. 2017; Brody et al. 2013; Highfield et al. 2013). 
 
One potential reason for the inaccuracy of floodplain maps is that they are mapped at a single 
point in time, neglecting to account for the effects of changing land use/land cover on flood 
flows in urban watersheds (Sebastian 2016). This problem is especially prominent in the 
Houston region where a lack of comprehensive land use controls has encouraged and allowed 
for largely unrestrained development across the region. It is important to note that there are no 
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significant geographic boundaries that limit Houston’s growth to the west or northwest and 
development of these areas has been characterized by urban sprawl – low-density, mono-
functional, car-dependent development – rapidly replacing the natural land cover with 
pavement. Between 1996 and 2010, the developed area in Harris County, alone, grew by more 
than 473 km2 (183 mi2), or 22.4%, greatly contributing to Houston’s flood problem by increasing 
overland rainfall run-off volumes and flow rates (NOAA 2016).  
 
 
3.4. Historic Tropical Cyclone Events 
Houston has been referred to as ‘America’s Flood Capital’ (Erdman 2016). Since the creation of 
the HCFCD in 1937, an estimated 30 damaging floods have occurred in the Houston area 
(HCFCD n.d.). Notable record-setting rainfall events include Tropical Storm Claudette (1979), 
Tropical Storm Allison (2001), and Hurricane Ike (2008). Tropical Storm Claudette made landfall 
on the Texas-Louisiana border on July 24, 1979. The storm stalled over Alvin, TX on the 
evening of July 25, dropping considerable rainfall. The highest one-day total in U.S. history was 
recorded in Alvin, TX where 1070 mm of rain fell in 24 hours and the total precipitation over the 
entire event was recorded to be 1143 mm. While Claudette’s heaviest rainfall narrowly missed 
the developed areas near downtown Houston, it demonstrated the potential for extreme rainfall 
in the region. 
 
Tropical Storm Allison made landfall on June 5, 2001. The storm stalled over Houston for four 
days. During Tropical Allison a large portion of Harris County received upwards of 800 mm of 
precipitation; the highest recorded total during the event was 985.5 mm. At one point during the 
event, more than 711.2 mm of rain fell in 12 hours near downtown Houston. Allison affected an 
estimated 2 million people, causing 22 fatalities, damaging 95,000 vehicles and 73,000 homes, 
and leaving over 30,000 people without homes (HCFCD n.d.). Substantial damage occurred at 
the Texas Medical Center and to businesses and infrastructure in downtown Houston. Insured 
losses totaled $5 billion USD and the total damages from Allison are estimated to have been 
around $9 billion USD, making it the costliest urban flood in U.S. history at the time (Blake and 
Gibney 2011).  
 
During Allison, two-thirds of the flooded areas were located outside of the mapped floodplain 
areas (FEMA n.d.). In the wake of the storm, Harris County received substantial funding from 
FEMA to comprehensively re-analyze the region’s flood risk. The Tropical Storm Allison 
Recovery Project (TSARP) aimed to revise the floodplain maps using more accurate data and 
latest models. As a result of this project, Houston became one of the first cities to utilize LiDAR 
to map the ground’s topography for floodplain modeling. The models were also updated to 
include the latest land use/land cover information. The new maps were used to better assess 
locations of substantial flood risk and affected flood insurance premiums. In addition, substantial 
upgrades were made to the Texas Medical Center (TMC), including further development of the 
Rice University/TMC Flood Alert System (FAS), the installation of flood doors and gates, and 
improvements to the campus’ emergency management strategy. A comprehensive list of 
upgrades and review of measures can be found in the paper by Fang et al. (2014).  
 
Hurricane Ike made landfall near Galveston Island on September 13, 2008 as a Category 2 
storm. While Ike was primarily a surge event, the interaction between storm surge and urban 
runoff in coastal areas highlighted the vulnerability of the region to compound flooding. In the 
wake of Hurricane Ike, several organizations have proposed structural solutions to mitigate 
storm surge flooding in the region including the coastal spine system, the Centennial Gate at 
the Houston Ship Channel, and, more recently, a mid-bay barrier  (Blackburn et al. 2014; 
Merrell et al. 2016) 
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3.5. Recent Precipitation Events 
In addition to tropical cyclones, two recent rainfall events resulted in severe flooding in Houston: 
the Memorial Day (May 26, 2015) and Tax Day (April 16-17, 2016) flood events. Properties in 
Brays Bayou, especially the Meyerland area, were flooded during both events. During both 
events, water in Brays Bayou overflowed the channel’s banks, emphasizing what could happen 
if a larger, more severe event were to occur. In addition, during the Tax Day Flood, the area 
upstream of Addicks and Barker Reservoirs received over 330-430 mm of rain in 12 hours and 
the water behind the reservoirs reached record levels. Severe flooding occurred in the Cypress 
Creek watershed. In total, an estimated 9,800 homes and 40,000 cars were affected during the 
Tax Day Flood (Lindner 2016); insured damages approached $0.5 billion USD (FEMA 2017b). 
 
After the Tax Day Flood, the HCFCD issued a statement encouraging Houstonians to purchase 
flood insurance to avoid dramatic out-of-pocket expenses during future events (HCFCD 2017a). 
In addition, public discussion about the limited capacity of the reservoirs took place and a 
number of proposals were put forward to reduce the vulnerability of Buffalo Bayou to flooding, 
including the constructing of a dam in Cypress Creek to prevent water for overflowing into the 
Addicks Reservoir (Caruba 2016). However, no flood risk reduction strategies were 
implemented prior to Hurricane Harvey. 
 
3.6. Understanding Flood Risk Management in Texas 
There are significant differences between the governance of flood risk reduction in the 
Netherlands and Texas. Whereas the responsibility for flood risk management in the 
Netherlands is largely shared between two authorities: Rijkswaterstaat at the national level and 
the Waterschappen (Water Boards) at the regional level (with some input from the Provinces 
and municipalities on land use issues), the responsibilities for managing flood risk in the U.S. 
are considerably more distributed. Flood risk management in the U.S. is often a shared 
responsibility between multiple federal, state, and local government agencies and organizations 
via a complex set of programs, responsibilities, and regulations (Figure 3.6).  
 
 
Figure 3.6. Distribution of flood risk management among federal, state, regional, and local authorities in 
the U.S. Modified from NRC (2013); Traver (2014); USACE (2006). 
 
 
TU Delft - Hurricane Harvey Report            Page 32 
 
Similar to Rijkswaterstaat in the Netherlands, there is a federal agency – the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers (USACE) – responsible for the construction, maintenance, and operation of large 
civil works. However, there is also an additional federal agency – the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) within U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – that is 
responsible for coordinating government-wide disaster relief by ‘preparing for, protecting 
against, responding to, recovering for, and mitigating all hazards’ (FEMA n.d.). FEMA is also 
responsible for administering the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and funding Hazard 
Mitigation Assistance (HMA) Grants to facilitate pre- and post-disaster mitigation (see Section 
3.3).  
 
At the regional and local levels, flood risk management becomes significantly more complex. 
Especially in the State of Texas, where, in general, an aversion to federal interference 
concerning land use and private property is prevalent, a scattered and increasingly localized 
organization of responsibility for flood risk management has developed over time. Several state-
level organizations, including the Texas General Land Office (GLO), the Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality (TCEQ), and the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT), are 
broadly involved in permitting and monitoring the state of urban infrastructure, including dams, 
storm water systems, and industrial facilities. In addition, there numerous local jurisdictions, 
including cities, levee improvement districts (LIDs)3, and municipal utility districts (MUDs)4, 
which set their own criteria for managing floods, designing urban infrastructure, and allocating 
resources for emergency response (Figure 3.7).   
 
 
 
Figure 3.7. MUDs and LIDs locations in Greater Houston (Source: TCEQ Water districts map viewer) 
 
 
 
                                                       
3 LIDs are created to manage and maintain public levees. They are not federally funded, so they rely on local ad 
valorem property taxes. The levee systems must meet and continue to meet minimum design, operation, and 
maintenance standards set forward by the USACE and FEMA to receive NFIP recognition. 
4 MUDs are political subdivisions of the State of Texas, authorized by the TCEQ, in areas where municipal services are 
not available (typically outside of city limits). They are independent, limited governments which are able to raise revenue 
via property taxes. They may be responsible for emergency services (e.g., fire, EMS, police); public works, engineering, 
and localized drainage systems; building permits for incorporated areas; and floodplain management. 
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Perhaps the most significant difference in flood risk management between the Netherlands and 
Texas is created by the fact that flooding in Texas occurs on a regular basis, and thus the public 
entities responsible for managing emergency response are not only strongly present, but also 
accompanied by multiple private and NGO organizations actively participating in reducing flood 
risk via Safety Layers III and in some extend in Safety Layer II (see Chapters 6 and 7). In the 
Netherlands, by contrast, a flood event is extremely rare and preferably prevented through 
structural measures (Safety Layer I) resulting in a lean emergency response system which 
relies on disaster and emergency response training rather than lessons learned through real-
world experiences. Moreover, few Dutch citizens have experienced a flood event (Kothuis and 
Heems 2012). 
 
 
3.7. Houston’s urban fabric and land use policies 
Empirical evidence exists that Houston’s lay out (where it is built: in watersheds and wetlands 
that serve as storage areas for extreme rainfall events) and its urban fabric (how it is built: 
sprawling, low-density development with an abundance of paved-over surface) have contributed 
to repetitive losses over time(Blessing et al. 2017; Brody et al. 2008, 2014). In fact, Harris 
County and surrounding areas rank among the highest rates of repetitive loss in the country 
(FEMA 2007). The flooding caused by Harvey and other recent flood events, suggest that an 
expanded strategy is required to include the urban fabric’s vulnerability to flooding, and policies 
and local cultural values behind it. To date, spatial research has identified two main obstacles 
that discourage spatial adaptation in the Galveston Bay area: fragmentation of discretionary 
powers (Brand, 2015; 2017) and inconsistency between existing urban planning documents 
(Berke et al., 2015; 2017).  
 
The region’s pro-development policy is a primary driver behind its extremely vulnerable land use 
pattern. Houston imposes minimal land use controls in favor of private initiative and economic 
growth (Lerup 2011). In the City of Houston, the municipality – the default government entity in 
charge of spatial planning tools throughout the world – does not have a zoning ordinance, the 
most basic tool of U.S. land use regulation. This does not mean that the metropolitan region’s 
urban development is completely uncontrolled; however the tools for control, like the so-called 
deed restrictions and building codes, reside within a multitude of special districts at the local 
level (i.e., MUDs and LIDS) that pursue their own independent policies (ULI, 2015). The 
capacity for ‘self-regulation’ of these special districts are locally seen a means to satisfy a high 
demand for new homes (Basset and Malpass 2013), and to build and maintain their own levee-
systems (like those in Fort Bend County). In 2015, policy makers at the city-level have 
succeeded to mobilize piecemeal policies of special districts into a shared spatial strategy 
geared towards economic growth (‘Plan Houston’).  
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Houston, Texas, August 31, 2017 (Image courtesy: FEMA - Dominick Del Vecchio)  
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Flooding during  
Hurricane Harvey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Between August 25 and 30, 2017 Hurricane Harvey dropped substantial rainfall over the City of 
Houston and surrounding areas resulting in devastating urban flooding (Figure 4.1). The highest 
precipitation totals during the storm were registered in southeast Harris County where isolated 
rainfall gages recorded as much as 1224 mm over the five-day period with some areas 
receiving upwards of 531 mm of rain in 12 hours during the morning of August 27 (Figure 4.4). 
By Sunday afternoon August 27, 2017, the majority of the 22 watersheds in Harris County were 
experiencing flooding with about half reaching record levels. In addition, widespread street 
flooding occurred city-wide as the storm sewer network reached its capacity.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. August 29, 2017 - A flooded bayou in Houston is carrying high amounts of rain water 
downstream (Image courtesy FEMA - Dominick Del Vecchio)  
4 
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Figure 4.4 (a) Cumulative 5-day precipitation totals (m) and (b) maximum 12-hour rainfall (m) intensities in 
Harris County, Texas. Red areas indicate the highest precipitation totals whereas blue areas indicate the 
lowest. Black dots show the location of precipitation gages.  
 
An overview of the HCFCD stream gage network is presented in Figure 4.5. The red markers 
illustrate locations where water levels exceeded the top of the channel at 12:00 AM (CDT) on 
August 28. By the morning of August 30, much of the water had receded from the 
neighborhoods and returned to within the confines of the channels with the exception of 
Cypress Creek, Buffalo Bayou, and Clear Creek, where local watershed conditions prevented 
the water from receding quickly.  
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Figure 4.5. Status of the HCFCD stream gages as of August 28, 2017 12:00 AM (CDT). Locations marked 
in red are out of bank and locations in yellow are near the top of bank. Figure courtesy of 
https://www.harriscountyfws.org/. 
 
 
Record-setting flooding during Hurricane Harvey occurred throughout the greater Houston 
region. To give the reader a sense of the extent and severity of flooding region-wide, the 
following sections focus on the hydrologic and hydraulic response in a few key watersheds: 
Buffalo Bayou and contributing areas; the San Jacinto River and Houston Ship Channel; and 
the Brazos River.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Map showing the locations of key areas discussed in the following sections: Buffalo Bayou; the 
San Jacinto River, Lake Houston, and lower portion of the Houston Ship Channel; and the Brazos River 
near Sugarland, Texas. 
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4.2. Buffalo Bayou – Addicks & Barker Reservoirs 
During and after Hurricane Harvey, substantial flooding occurred both upstream and 
downstream of the Addicks and Barker reservoirs. On August 25, in preparation for Harvey, the 
USACE had closed flood gates ‘as a routine precaution’ prior to a predicted rainfall event. In 
part due to the large volumes of water flowing into the reservoirs, neighborhoods built within the 
footprint of the dam (i.e., those at levels lower than the maximum elevation of the dams) began 
to flood before the water levels in the reservoirs could be sufficiently reduced (i.e., the inflow 
exceeded the outflow). Downstream of the reservoirs, portions of Buffalo Bayou had already 
exceeded channel capacity prior to controlled releases that began on August 28. Other areas 
were at or near channel capacity and flooding was further exacerbated by reservoir releases. 
The chain of events leading to flooding along Buffalo Bayou is described in further detail below.  
 
Addicks and Barker Reservoirs 
Between August 25 and 28, approximately 254 and 457 mm of rain fell in the contributing areas 
upstream of the Addicks and Barker reservoirs, respectively (HCFCD 2017b). Water rose inside 
the reservoirs, reaching record levels. Around midnight on August 27, water began rising into 
neighborhoods on the western and northern sides of the reservoirs. At this point, the Army 
Corps of Engineers (USACE) announced that it would begin controlled releases from Addicks 
and Barker in the early morning hours on August 28 at ‘higher-than-normal’ rates (above 
115m3/s) to prevent uncontrolled and even catastrophic releases from the dams (i.e., due to 
overflowing of the emergency spillways or dam failure) and reduce additional flood risks.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Longitudinal cross section of Addicks Dam and reservoir pool.  
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Figure 4.8. Expected water levels in areas downstream of Addicks and Barker reservoirs when release 
rates exceed 115 m3/s. Depths in downstream areas can increase an additional 0.6 – 1.2 meters (in 
yellow) to 1.5 - 1.8 meters (in orange) above normal levels when releases occur. Courtesy of HCFCD. 
 
 
The USACE began releasing water around 02:00 AM (CDT) at Addicks and 11:00 AM (CDT) at 
Barker on Monday, August 28 (Harden and Ellis 2017). The combined releases from the two 
reservoirs peaked on August 28 with Addicks releasing at about 200 m3/s and Barker at about 
170 m3/s. The reservoirs continued to rise until August 30 due to continued rainfall and 
substantial runoff from areas upstream, including overflow from the Cypress Creek watershed. 
Despite controlled releases, the water flowed over and around the emergency spillways of the 
Addicks reservoir, peaking at 33.5 meters on August 30 (Figure 4.9a). The water levels in the 
Barker Reservoir remained below the level of the spillways, peaking at 31 meters on August 30 
(Figure 4.9b). The USACE continuously monitored the dam during the event and has indicated 
that there was no risk of failure. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9.a (Full caption next page) 
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Figure 4.9b. Water levels (m NAVD88) in (a) Addicks (USGS 8073000) and (b) Barker (USGS 8072500) 
reservoirs between August 25 and September 10, 2017. The tops of the spillways are at 31.2 and 29.0 m, 
respectively. The previous record maximum water elevations reached during the Tax Day Flood (2016) are 
also shown. 
 
To reduce the levels of water in the reservoirs behind the dams as quickly as possible, the 
USACE continued releasing water at higher than normal rates through the second week of 
September (for a period of approximately 15 days), after which the rates were lowered to 115 
m3/s.  
 
 
Figure 4.10. Approximate release rates (m3/s) from Addicks and Barker Reservoirs as reported by USACE 
starting on August 28. Release rates are reported to have peaked at about 200m3/s and 170 m3/s, 
respectively. Reduction of releases were reported as of September 4, however, the rate of release during the 
period between September 4 and 17 is unknown. By September 17, releases had been reduced to 115m3/s.  
Flood levels in Buffalo Bayou 
By mid-day on August 27, before the USACE is reported to have begun releasing water from 
the reservoirs, water levels in Buffalo Bayou had already exceeded its banks in the areas 
directly downstream of the dams (e.g., at Beltway 8). Water levels continued to rise after the 
releases began on August 28, eventually peaking at 23.4 meters on August 30 (Figure 4.11). 
This is the highest water level ever recorded at this location; considering that the 500-year water 
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level is estimated by the HCFCD to be 22.8 meters, the water level likely exceeded the 500-
year event (HCFCD 2017c). Moreover, considering that the majority of rain had already fallen 
prior to releases from the dam on August 28 (Figure 4.12), it is expected that much of the 
flooding in neighborhoods downstream of the dams was exacerbated by the release of water 
from the reservoirs, however, further investigation and a more detailed hydrological modeling 
study is recommended to assess the exact contribution of the reservoir releases to downstream 
flooding and flood impacts. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11. Water levels in Buffalo Bayou, at Beltway 8, between August 26 and September 9..  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Discharge through Buffalo Bayou expressed in cubic meters per second (cms). Included is the 
average annual discharge rate (approx. 11 cms) based on records from 1971-2017. 
 
As of September 1, 2017, it was estimated that approximately 4,000 homes had been affected 
by flooding downstream of the reservoirs. Anecdotal evidence from citizens living in the 
neighborhoods downstream of Addicks and Barker Reservoirs has suggested that insufficient 
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information was provided prior to the releases of the reservoirs and that flooding occurred 
earlier than anticipated. Moreover, the speed with which water rose in these neighborhoods 
came as a surprise, forcing many residents to flee their homes with little preparation and 
necessitating a number of rescues. Conversations with residents suggest that the loss of 
personal property (e.g., cars, house contents) could have been avoided with additional warning. 
However, further investigation is required to determine whether there were mistakes in terms of 
emergency warning and public communication or whether water levels rose faster than 
expected by public officials, and if so, why.   
 
 
4.3. San Jacinto River 
Lake Houston is a reservoir on the San Jacinto River. The reservoir was built in 1953 and 
serves as the primary municipal water supply for the City of Houston. During Hurricane Harvey, 
water levels in the reservoir peaked at nearly 16.1 meters overtopping the top of the spillway by 
approximately 3.3 meters. This is the highest level ever recorded and considering that the 500-
year water level at the spillway is estimated by the HCFCD to be 15.8 meters, the water level 
likely exceeded the 500-year event (HCFCD 2017c). Downstream of the dam, flood levels were 
so high that many stream gages along the river stopped recording or malfunctioned. Moreover, 
the combined flows from other watersheds in Harris County (e.g., Buffalo Bayou) and the San 
Jacinto River caused the water in the Houston Ship Channel to rise to unprecedented levels. It 
is also possible that high water surface elevations in Galveston Bay due to Harvey’s storm 
surge further exacerbated flooding in the Houston Ship Channel. 
 
 
Figure 4.13. Water levels at the Lake Houston Dam near Sheldon, Texas (USGS 08072000). 
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4.4. Brazos River 
In addition to flooding in Harris County, the Brazos River in 
Fort Bend and Brazoria Counties (Figure 4.13) southwest 
of Houston also reached record levels. In Fort Bend 
County, several levee systems were built to protect 
neighborhoods adjacent to the Brazos River from flooding. 
These levees are designed to withstand the 100-year flood 
event and have an approximate height of 18 meters. Initial 
predictions forecasted water levels in that area to reach as 
high as 18 meters suggesting that the river would overflow 
much of the levee systems in the area. Fortunately, the 
river crested at 16.8 meters on Thursday, August 31 
(Figure 4.14).  
      Figure 4.14. Map of Brazos River 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.15. Water levels in the Brazos River near Richmond, Texas (USGS 8114000).  
 
 
Although no levees overtopped, at least two complications with levees were reported. Near 
Pecan Grove, an open valve beneath the levee was leaking water through the levee, which 
required an emergency fix. A heavy crane operator and a dive team were able to close the 
valve. Further downstream, near Sienna Plantation, the interior rim of the levee system required 
reinforcements to prevent overtopping. Volunteers and the National Guard increased the crest 
of the levee with plywood and two-by-fours. Because the river water levels were not forecasted 
to decrease, they ran temporary pumps forcing seepage water back in to the river, and placed 
sand bags on top to increase the height (Carpenter and Foxhall 2017). According to the Fort 
Bend County Office of Emergency Management, the problems were not believed to be a cause 
for major concern (Foxhall 2017). Nevertheless, news about levees breaching near Columbia 
Lakes had spread (Figure 4.15). 
 
 
 
 
TU Delft - Hurricane Harvey Report            Page 44 
 
 
 
Figure 4.15. Wrongfully issued warning by Brazoria County about levees breaching (Retrieved from 
CNBC/ County of Brazoria) 
 
 
4.5. How does Harvey compare to previous floods? 
Many reports have stated that Harvey was unprecedented and various return periods have 
been mentioned in combination with precipitation and flood levels during Hurricane Harvey, 
ranging from 100 years to over 1000 years (Meyer 2017; Samenow 2017). In this section we 
attempt to substantiate some of these claims by comparing Harvey against previous floods and 
available information regarding return period rainfall and water levels.  
 
The precipitation rates observed during Harvey for Harris County were compared to the depth-
duration frequency (DDF) values calculated by USGS for sub-regions in Texas which can be 
found in Asquith (1998). Figure 4.16 shows a comparison between the peak rainfall totals at two 
gage locations: gage 1730 in Cedar Bayou and gage 110 in Clear Creek, and the curves for five 
duration periods: 1-, 2-, 3-, 5-, and 7-days, in Harris County Region III. The results indicate that 
Harvey was, indeed, an extreme event with respect to rainfall. None of the observed maxima 
correspond to a predicted return period shorter than 5,000 years according to existing frequency 
estimates5.  
 
                                                       
5 It is important to note that the return periods are based upon historical observations and are statistically extrapolated 
from point estimates. Results for very low probabilities should thus be interpretated with the greatest care. This is 
illustrated by the observed maximum for 3-day rainfall, which coincides with a return period of more than 6 million years. 
This does not seem to be a realistic return period, suggesting that the distributions and parameters for the derivation of 
the return periods from the USGS should be re-evaluated – leading to changes in the curves. 
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Figure 4.17 Observed precipitation in Cedar Bayou (Gage 1730) and Clear Creek (Gage 110) in inches for 
five different periods during Harvey compared with the existing curves for the expected maximum rainfall. 
The precipitation curves are fitted with the Generalized Extreme Value distribution.	  
Also, water levels for some locations have been compared with existing estimates of return 
periods. For example, in the Brays Bayou, the level of flooding is similar to what was observed 
during the Memorial Day Flood in 2015, which according to HCFCD estimates corresponds to a 
return period between the 100-year and the 500-year event. For example, water levels at 
Almeda Road peaked at 12.3 meters while the 100-year water level is estimated at 11.9 meters 
and the 500-year water level 12.8 meters. In Clear Creek and Dickinson Bayou, the water levels 
during Harvey exceeded those during TS Claudette, the previous storm of record (and have 
exceeded water levels during Hurricane Ike). The water level in Clear Creek at I-45 reaching a 
level of 5.1 meters. This exceeds the 500-year event that was estimated at 4.6 meters. 
Similarly, in Cypress Creek watershed, some stage gages recorded water surface elevations 
over 3 meters above the channel banks. The catastrophic flooding levels in Cypress Creek 
watershed during Hurricane Harvey surpassed levels observed during the Tax Day flood of April 
2016 (SSPEED report).  
 
The comparison of Harvey against previous events has raised questions as to whether the 
strength of the hurricane was affected by climate change. The IPCC suggests that in the future, 
a warmer climate will lead to more intense hurricanes, pointing to the possibility that Harvey’s 
outsized rainfall could be attributed to climate change. While higher-than-average temperatures 
in the Gulf of Mexico likely fueled Harvey’s development into a Category 4 hurricane just before 
landfall, the upper atmospheric weather phenomena that contributed to Hurricane Harvey’s 
track and subsequently the immense amount of rain that fell have not yet been studied.  
 
It is important to point out that storms that stall over Harris County have occurred in the past. 
Both Tropical Storm Claudette (1979) and Allison (2001) behaved similarly to Harvey in that 
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they remained over the region for multiple days, but the notable difference in these events were 
that they were substantially smaller in spatial scale. The cumulative totals from both of these 
events fell across and much smaller area, and while they caused devastating flooding in certain 
watersheds, their impacts at a regional scale are dwarfed by Hurricane Harvey. In addition, 
while significant measures were taken to reduce flood risk in Harris County after Allison, the 
number of people and structures in the region has grown substantially, increasing exposure to 
floods.  
 
Finally, substantial evidence suggests that rapid growth in Houston and decisions regarding the 
management of and flood control in Houston’s watersheds have likely contributed to the 
substantial losses that were observed during Hurricane Harvey. While the cumulative 
precipitation and intensity of rainfall during Harvey was beyond typical engineering design 
criteria, measures can be taken to help reduce risk of rainfall-induced flooding in the future.  
Recommendations regarding directions for research on flood risk reduction and mitigation in the 
Houston region are discussed in Chapter 8. 
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Damages  
and Fatalities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this report, we describe economic damages and the number of fatalities for which the data 
was available at the time of writing. Total damage estimates due to Harvey still vary. According 
to the NY Times, total damage estimates ranged from 70 to 108 billion USD as of September 
1st, while Texas Governor Greg Abbott suggested that the damage could reach between 150 
and 180 billion USD. This puts Harvey as the second costliest event in U.S. History, with 
Hurricane Katrina being the first. Among the top ten most costly events in the US, at this point 
three will have occurred in Houston: Allison (2001), Ike (2008) and Harvey (2017).  
 
Flood damages are typically categorized as economic damages, expressed in monetary terms 
(e.g., houses and cars), and non-economic damages, not expressed in monetary terms (e.g., 
injuries and fatalities). Among the economic damages, a distinction is made between direct and 
indirect damages:  
• Direct damages constitute damages caused by flooding in the affected areas. Examples 
include water damage to houses, cars, buildings, agriculture, infrastructure, evacuation 
and shelter costs and business losses within the flooded area.  
• Indirect damages constitute damages and costs outside of the flooded area. Examples 
include business losses from business located outside the affected area, temporary 
housing outside the flooded area, social disruption and governmental costs.  
 
The following sections describe impacts to residential structures (section 5.2), industry (section 
5.3), the environment (section 5.4), airports (section 5.5), and critical infrastructure (section 5.6), 
as well as the reported fatalities (section 5.7).  
 
 
5 
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5.2. Damage to residential structures 
Many of the Bayous flow through populated residential areas which were flooded when the 
Bayous reached full capacity and overtopped. Here, roadways turned into entire rivers. Damage 
to houses range from mild to severe, depending on the height, velocity and duration of flood 
levels inside the structure. After having overtopped, the water levels in many of the Bayous 
(e.g., White Oak, Brays) receded quickly leaving the surrounding neighborhoods dry after 
having been flooded for several hours. However, also with short durations of flooding, as of 
August 27 FEMA predicted that more than 90,000 residential structures in Harris, Galveston 
and Fort Bend counties could have been damage from the storm. Predictions were based on a 
comparison against the 500-year floodplain (given that the flood levels were expected to have 
exceeded the 500 year flood level).  
 
Especially near Addicks and Barker dams, where the controlled releases through the dam have 
resulted in high velocities and flood depths, a lot of residential structures would have suffered 
major damages. The duration of flooding in these areas is significant due to the long period of 
controlled releases required to drain the reservoirs. Fleetwood and Briar Hills neighborhoods, 
for example, situated directly downstream of both dams, experienced flooding well over the 500 
year floodplain as shown in Figure 3.5, Chapter 3.  
 
Final damage estimates still vary. As of August 29th, FEMA estimated that 115,412 houses 
would have suffered some form of damage. By September 6th, the Houston Chronicle estimated 
a total of 119,000 houses damaged by Harvey of which 800 are destroyed completely. Texans 
filed more than 87,000 flood insurance claims after Hurricane Harvey as of 28 September 2017, 
and the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) has made $608 million in expedited claims 
payments. NFIP implemented temporary changes to the claims process to help policyholders 
get started rebuilding as soon as possible. 
 
Besides damage to houses, flooding left 300,000 people without power. In addition, initial 
estimates suggest that about 500,000 cars are damages due to Harvey. The full extent of 
damages to infrastructure is still unknown, although there are several reports of bridges 
collapsing due to scouring of the foundations. Some of the earlier-mentioned sites or 
neighborhoods have suffered repetitive losses over the last two decades (since Allison), and/or 
have developed a reputation for being vulnerable to flood losses. Such sites include the 
community of Meyerland in southeast Houston, and Turkey Creek, near Addicks reservoir. 
 
5.3. Damage to industry 
Industrial damages triggered by floods are among the most frequent technological disasters 
triggered by natural-hazard, i.e., ‘natech’ disasters. These damages can be divided in direct 
damages (e.g., to structures and equipment) and business losses suffered due to downtime.  
• Direct damages: The hydrostatic and hydrodynamic forces of floods can cause 
structural damage to chemical- and process facilities (Figure 5.4). Structural damage 
can be in the form of displacement, floating, overturning, and shell buckling of vessels 
along with shell rupture due to the impact of waterborne debris. The displacement of 
process vessels (due to sliding, flotation, overturning, and even excessive shell 
buckling) may lead to the damage of connected pipelines. Roof collapse occurs 
regularly as well. 
• Indirect damages: Floods can cause cascading effect in industry, where floodwaters 
can cause electrical or cooling equipment to shut down due to power outages, 
ultimately resulting in entire plants to shut down, which may lead to significant business 
disruption and loss of revenue.  
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Direct damages 
Structural damages may result in disastrous release of hazardous chemicals, which, aside from 
the danger of subsequent fires and explosions, can cause very severe environmental pollutions.  
The damage to chemical and process facilities due to the Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 
led to the second largest environmental pollution in the U.S. after the Deep Horizon disaster in 
the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. A massive oil spill that threatens this town in St. Bernard Parish resulted when an oil tank was 
forced from its foundation by Hurricane Katrina's massive storm surge. (Courtesy of Bob McMillan/ FEMA) 
 
The following table includes a list of industrial plants that suffered direct damages during 
Hurricane Harvey, while the following section describes the environmental damages resulting 
from direct damages to industrial facilities.  
 
Table 5.1. Type of industrial plants damaged during the Hurricane Harvey  
 
Company Name Type of Industry Type of toxic chemicals 
Invista Plastic Manufacturer Polytetramethylene ether glycol,  
Tetrahydrofuran, and 1,4 Butane Diol 
LyondellBasell Plastic Manufacturer Polymers 
LyondellBasell Refinery Gasoline, diesel, benzene, paraxylene,  
orthoxylene 
Celanese 
Chemical  
Chemicals Manufacturer Methanol 
Dow Plastic Manufacturer Polyurethanes 
Eastman Plastic Manufacturer non-phthalate plasticizers 
Indorama 
Ventures 
Chemicals Manufacturer Ethylene Oxide 
Indorama 
Ventures 
Plastics Manufacturer Glycols 
Arkema Chemicals Manufacturer Sulfuric substances 
ExxonMobil Refinery Acrylic Acid 
Enterprise Refinery Hydrocarbon fuels 
Chevron Phillips Petrochemical  Hydrocarbon fuels 
Shell Refinery NGL fractionators 
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Indirect damages  
As a large portion of the nation’s refining capacity is situated along Texas Gulf Coast, the 
impact on the oil and gas industry is significant. Cascading effects due to Harvey include 
several refineries along the coast to shut down, due to power outages caused by flooding. As of 
September 1st, an estimated 3 million barrels per day of refining capacity have been still down 
due to flooding caused by Harvey, which represents 16% of the nation’s refining capacity. As a 
result, gas prices in Texas have increased with $0.50 per gallon. Also in New York, gas prices 
increased by $0.20 per gallon, because the Texas-to-Jersey gas pipeline is not delivering any 
gas to the city. The direct (material) damage to refining facilities is still unknown. Other indirect 
damages due to Harvey industry include damages to the car industry, where estimates suggest 
that a total of 366,000 new vehicles suffered damages due to Harvey.  
 
Arkema facility  
At Arkema facility in Crosby, Texas (Figures 5.2 and 5.3), approximately 1016 mm (40 in.) of 
rain caused flooding of the majority of the chemical plant which caused power outages in the 
entire plant. The back-up generators were also quickly flooded causing the entire facility to shut 
down on Sunday (August 27th). At the facility are refrigerators containing organic peroxide; the 
low-temperature in un-refrigerated trailers can catch fire and degrade. This caused at least two 
explosions at the facility in the days after.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Arkema facility in Crosby, Texas; August 31, 2017 (Photo: Arkema Facebook page). 
 
5.4. Environmental damage 
Water dispersion and reaction with released toxic chemicals due to flooding are the main 
causes of environmental damage (e.g., soil contamination, wildlife damage, etc.) as well as 
water resource pollution (leakage of toxic substances to groundwater and surface waters). 
Ignition of flammable – and explosive chemical substances (e.g. hydrocarbons) - floating on the 
floodwaters can also be a potential source of hazard and environmental damage. As of 
September 12, Hurricane Harvey was estimated to have caused 2.000 tons of chemicals to be 
released.  
 
At refineries, damages to storage tanks can cause considerable environmental damages. For 
example, during Hurricane Katrina, ruptured storage tanks released several millions of gallons 
of oil causing huge oil spills in the surrounding areas. Also during Harvey, more than two dozen 
storage tanks ruptured spilling large amounts of crude oil and gasoline (about 550 cubic meters) 
into surrounding areas and releasing toxic pollutants into the air. ExxonMobil for example, had 
to shut down two facilities, with one damaged plant in Baytown releasing more than 5,6 tons of 
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chemicals including benzene and xylene.In addition, due to the large amount of rainfall that fell 
during Harvey, the “floating roofs” (i.e., roofs on tanks that float on the chemicals that are stored 
inside them) of 400 storage tanks experienced problems causing at least 14 roofs to sink. 
These also caused pollutants to be released into the air. Refineries and chemical plants in the 
Houston Ship Channel region have reported more than 2,700 tons, or 5.4m pounds, of extra air 
pollution due to direct damage from the hurricane as well as the preventive shutting down of 
facilities 
 
Days after Hurricane Harvey hit the Houston area, toxic substances have reportedly been 
spreading miles from a damaged chemical plant. Tests detected the substances in soil, water 
and ash samples taken miles from Arkema plant that flooded during Harvey (1.8 m of water 
flooded the plant), caught fire and partially exploded.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.3. The EPA states on their Response to Hurricane Harvey: “Arkema Facility, Crosby TX. At the 
Arkema chemical plant in Crosby, emergency responders undertook a 24-hour operation to monitor the 
facility due to fires that erupted on August 31 and September 1, 2017.” (Text and image retrieved from 
epa.gov.arcgis.com ; October 17, 2017). 
 
Superfund sites are sites where toxic wastes have been dumped and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) has designated them to be cleaned up. By September 22, 2017, EPA 
had assessed all 43 Superfund sites located in the hurricane-affected area (Figure 5.2). and on 
the National Priority List (NPL). Of these, 42 sites have been cleared from contaminations. The 
San Jacinto Waste Pits site requires additional follow up. These waste pits are currently 
protected by an “armored cap” which is a fabric layered with large rocks designed to prevent 
contaminated soils from being released, while the courts determine what to do with them. This 
cap has required extensive repairs six times since it was placed in 2011. Harvey’s floodwaters 
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damaged parts of the cap resulting in sediments containing dioxin being released from the 
waste pits in to the bay system. As of October 6, the Responsible Parties are continuing cap 
repairs and maintenance activities under EPA oversight. The repair includes manual placement 
of the armor rock that is placed on a pontoon and positioned over the deficient areas. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Superfund sites located in Hurricane Harvey affected area (Map courtesy EPA, retrieved from 
epa.maps.arcis.com October 17, 2017) 
 
 
 
5.5. Airports affected 
Confronted with the threat and passing of Harvey, the airports in the wider Houston area served 
different functions. Prior to the arrival of the hurricane, airports are mainly used as a getaway for 
people in the region to escape from the possible hurricane impact, or serve to pre-position 
essential relief items. After the hurricane has passed airports serve as hubs for delivering any 
needed relief, such as water, food or temporary shelter, in addition to their role of getting 
stranded passengers on their way out or getting evacuated inhabitants back home.  
 
Before, during and after the hurricane, airports face many challenges such as the prioritization 
of landing slots, import regulations, cargo handling, passenger handling (PAX), storage 
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capacities, etc. These functions are often affected by damaged infrastructures once the 
hurricane hits, precisely at a time when the incoming relief presents an increased load on the 
airport systems and operations in terms of aviation, in-and out-bound logistics or protective 
measures (safety, security and medical).  
 
Commercial flights at the two busiest Houston airports – George Bush Intercontinental Airport 
Houston (IAH) and William P. Hobby Airport (HOU) – remained grounded for five days in a row 
(Friday August 25 – Tuesday August 29), resuming limited operations by Wednesday August 30 
at 4 pm. Harvey caused over 10.000 flights nationwide to be cancelled during the hurricane and 
in the days after.  
 
By Thursday morning, August 31, 2017, the Federal Aviation had issued 43 unmanned aircraft 
system authorizations to drone operators supporting the response and recovery for Hurricane 
Harvey or covering it as part of the media. The authorizations cover a broad range of activities 
by local, state and federal officials who are conducting damage assessments of critical 
infrastructure, homes and businesses to help target, prioritize and expedite recovery activities. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Tweets on the use and accessibility of IAH 
 
With the Harvey Hackathon (Chapter 8), we analysed the activities of 24 large and regional 
airports in the wider Houston area, ranging from the immediately affected George Bush IAH to 
Austin-Bergstrom international airport where the U.S. President landed a few days after the 
hurricane for his visit to the Houston area. Not all airports were directly affected by Harvey, yet 
most of those felt the indirect consequences as flights had to be rerouted or cancelled due to 
closure by the other, affected, airports.  
 
The information gathered during the hackathon pointed mostly at the direct consequences for 
the airport, ranging from destroyed weather reporting services (Corpus Christi airport), flight 
cancellations to unusable runways (102 flights cancelled at Houston William P. Hobby airport, 
runways closed). Passenger care was another important theme: providing clean drinking water, 
cots and food to stranded passengers, simply counting the number of people still in the 
terminals, allowing people to pick up their cars from parking lots that had been flooded, or 
offering waivers to passengers whose flight was cancelled. Indirect effects were also identified: 
supply roads were flooded and impassable, so employees could not reach the airport for work.  
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5.6. Critical Infrastructure 
Critical infrastructures are lifeline systems, on which societies depend. Without communication 
communities are not able to connect and ask for help (see Section 6.4), and without 
transportation professional responders are unable to reach those in need or to organize 
evacuation. Damage to critical infrastructures therefore directly impacts the response operation.  
 
During the Harvey Hackathon (Chapter 8), students were looking for reports of critical 
infrastructure disruptions. More than 100 reports and news items related to disruptions of 
infrastructures were identified. Over 80% of the data sources retrieved were media sources 
(newspaper sites such as Guardian or NY times as well as local news agencies). Second, about 
10 % of the reports stemmed from official reports including FEMA or EPA. And finally, about 8% 
of the sources were social media (Twitter and Facebook). Note that sometimes, initial social 
media findings were verified through official media outlets and then categorized under the latter.  
 
The distribution of disruptions that were retrieved during the Hackathon show a focus on 
transportation, oil and chemical industry (Figure 5.9). The first, because of the frequent reports 
of roadblocks or disrupted air traffic (see § 5.5) that were part of the warnings and instructions 
to citizens.  
 
 
Figure 5.9: Share of information items reporting disruptions per sector, as retrieved during the Harvey 
Hackathon, in total 81 disruptions were reported. 
 
Disruptions of the transportation network were also important for their impact on industry. Major 
disruptions occurred the because of halted traffic due to flooded roadways and damaged 
infrastructure, suspended rail service, closures of regional shipping terminals and ports in 
Houston, Galveston, Texas City and Freeport and chaotic supply chains due to extra shipments 
and lower productivity. Many companies including Valero Energy, ExxonMobil, Motiva and 
Royal Dutch Shell shut down operations in southern Texas, and almost one-third of U.S. 
refineries have been affected by Harvey. In a Forbes survey, supply chain managers particularly 
expect impacts on fuel and petrochemical products with potentially important impacts for other 
industries such as automotive.  
 
Figure 5.10 also highlights that initially the focus was on immediate warnings and reports that 
directly related to the safety and well-being of affected citizens, including transportation, 
healthcare, communication, energy and housing. Later on, also more longer-term impact in 
terms of education or financial implications became more prominent. In total, 45 of the 350 
schools suffered from water damages, but even if schools and sports centers were not affected 
by the hurricane directly, many of them were used as shelters. 
 
Total	  Disruptions	  Reported	  
Transportation	   Health	   Energy	  
Oil	   Communication	   Housing	  
Financial	  	   Chemical	  Industry	   Drinking	  Water	  
Education	   Emergency	  Services	   Waste	  Water	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In case of Harvey, not surprisingly the chemical and oil industry received special attention. The 
prominent role of Houston’s oil and chemical industry has been discussed before, but also for 
the pollution they caused (see § 5.2 and § 5.3). The NY times listed a wide range of damages: 
“escaping gasoline from a submerged roof at a Phillips 66 storage tank; a sinking tank roof at 
ExxonMobil’s vast refinery in Baytown, which resulted in the release of hazardous gases 
including volatile organic compounds and benzene above permitted levels; and a lightning strike 
that disrupted operations and led to toxic-gas releases at a Dow Chemical plant in Freeport.” 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10. Evolution of disruption reports over time, data as retrieved during Harvey Hackathon 
 
Perhaps most prominently figure the fires that broke out a chemical plant in Crosby, TX. 
Because of power blackouts and failures of generators, the cooling systems needed to keep the 
chemicals (organic peroxides) safe were failing. Because of the disrupted road infrastructures, 
fire fighters could not access the site, and eventually decided to let the chemicals burn out and 
keep evacuation plans in-place in case further containers would explode.  
 
Further examples of so-called secondary or indirect effects include failures of 911 systems (and 
access to emergency services) as a consequence of outages in the communication network. 
Combined with the typical overload of the phone network in disasters, population then reverted 
to using social media hashtags instead of official communication lines.  
 
In total, about one third of the reports the students retrieved related to indirect effects of Harvey, 
underlining the importance of cascades and rippling effects. Figure 5.11 maps the 
interdependencies that were identified during the Hackathon. It shows the different critical 
infrastructures and highlights specifically the important role of energy and power supply, as well 
as the severe consequences (in red) of disruptions of the communication, drinking water and 
emergency services.  
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Figure 5.11 Circle analysis of critical infrastructure dependencies that were collected during the Harvey 
Hackathon showing the impact colors - red is most severe. (Image courtesy of Micheline Hounjet, 
Deltares). 
 
This initial exploration of critical infrastructure failures and their interdependencies will serve as 
a basis for a deeper analysis of critical infrastructure resilience.  
 
 
 
5.7. Fatalities 
As part of the fact finding, information on fatalities due to Harvey has been assessed. 
Determination of a death toll due to hurricanes and large-scale floods has proven to be 
complicated in the past. During past events, most fatalities have occurred due to water related 
incidents (Rappaport, 2014). Substantial additional mortality occurs outside the flood zone, and 
due to indirect causes, such as incidents during recovery. This analysis focussed on fatalities in 
the greater Houston area, directly due to the hurricane and flooding, and those that died within 
the first days after the disaster.  
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Figure 5.12 Location and number of fatalities following Hurricane Harvey along the southern Texas Coast 
(upper image) and in the Houston metropolitan area (lower image) as of September 21, 2017. For four of 
the victims, no details about the location were available. 
 
  
... 
... 
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In the days after Hurricane Harvey, information about casualties appeared mostly on local news 
websites. Although the larger part of the casualties fell during or directly after Harvey made 
landfall, even four weeks later, newly discovered casualties were mentioned in the media. Data 
sources included various media reports and data from the county6. Official reporting on 
casualties and the level of detail varied greatly between counties. Harris County, where most of 
the victims fell, is the only county so far that has published an official and public list of 
casualties. 
 
Data analysis 
In order to analyse the Harvey related casualties, a database has been compiled. Information 
about the victim (age, gender) and the circumstances of death (location, time, cause of death) 
were listed. Additional details on the circumstances, if available, were collected as well. These 
details can contribute to further analysis (e.g. correlation with flood levels, direct/indirect 
casualties, possible lack of judgement). 
 
At least 78 people have died as a result of Harvey. This number includes both direct and 
indirect casualties. Approximately half of the victims were found in Harris County (38 out of 78). 
Casualties stretch so far over 14 counties with a large spatial scattering (maximum distance of 
over 200 miles). The recovery locations of the victims are shown in Figure 5.12. 
 
The number of casualties increased over time: 38 deaths were reported until August 30th, 50 
deaths were reported until September 3rd and 78 deaths were reported as of September 21. 
The direct casualties during Harvey appeared to be mostly caused by drowning accidents (54 
out of 78). Many of them were found after floodwaters receded. A significant part of the victims 
drowned as a result of driving a vehicle into floodwaters or getting swept away by the current 
while getting out of a car (confirmed for 18 of 54 drowning victims). A tragic example is a case 
were six individuals of one family, including four children, drowned when their van ended up in 
high water in east Houston. An overview of causes of death is shown in Figure 5.13. Besides 
drowning, lack of medical treatment is the second biggest death cause and consists mostly of 
(very) ill people who did not get proper treatment in time (i.e. dialysis, asthma, heart failure). A 
smaller number of fatalities occurred due to other causes such as car accidents (n=4) and 
electrocution (n=4). 
 
                                                       
6 Selection of consulted sources (in total over 30 sources have been consulted): 
- https://ifs.harriscountytx.gov/Pages/default.aspx  
- http://www.chron.com/news/houston-weather/hurricaneharvey/article/Harvey-Aftermath-Houston-police-officer-dies-
19-12159139.php#photo-14023358 
- https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/us/harvey-texas-flooding.html 
- http://www.beaumontenterprise.com/news/article/Profiles-Those-we-lost-to-Harvey-12206036.php#photo-14151715 
- https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/08/30/a-toddler-clung-to-her-mother-in-harvey-
floodwaters-only-one-survived/?utm_term=.8e7234db8f5a 
- http://www.galvnews.com/news/free/article_a2aefdbf-1e2d-5af4-9cf6-9eafff89a748.html 
- https://www.buzzfeed.com/briannasacks/at-least-16-people-have-died-in-tropical-storm-harvey-
as?utm_term=.fh3Ken3Y7#.pne42kXxM 
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Figure 5.13 Causes of death due to Hurricane Harvey, both direct and indirect. 
 
 
Of the victims, 59% was male and 28% was female. For 13%, the gender is unknown. The 
majority of male fatalities are in line with findings for previous floods (Jonkman & Kelman, 
2005). Males tend to be involved more in risky activities, such as driving and rescue. 
 
Table 5.2 shows a classification based on age, a relative large part of the victims were over 50 
years old. This suggests an increased vulnerability for elderly people as was also found for the 
flooding of New Orleans due to hurricane Katrina. 
 
Table 5.2. Classification of victims based on age. 
 
Age Number Percentage 
0-18 6 8% 
19-50 22 28% 
51-65 19 24% 
>65 19 24% 
Unknown 12 15% 
 
 
Apart from the deadly victims, many more were injured. Also, longer-term health effects are 
expected associated with the experience of the flood event, and possibly due to pollution and 
increased moisture levels in flooded homes. Furthermore, dozens of people are currently still 
missing. As there is no central institution that keeps track of missing persons, most 
communication is via social media. Many times, people are found but their status is never 
updated. 
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(Top) Marines hand over supplies, Orange, TX (Courtesy: Marine Corps, Photo by Lance Cpl. Niles Lee). 
 
(Mid) Hurricane survivors seek assistance at a nearby FEMA Disaster Recovery Center at the Colorado 
County Services Facility in Columbus, Texas (Courtesy FEMA News Photo). 
 
(Bottom) Debris on the side of a road in Houston, TX (Courtesy: FEMA News Photo).  
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Emergency  
Response &  
Decision Making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Hurricane Harvey created significant impact on both the physical environment and the lives of 
people in the greater Houston area as illustrated in the previous chapters. In this chapter we 
introduce another aspect of Hurricane Harvey: the emergency response and related decision-
making processes to reduce its impact. Impact reduction includes prevention of injuries and 
casualties, reducing damage to property and infrastructure, and preventing further escalation of 
a crisis situation.  
  
The emergency response stage differs from the prevention and preparation stages. Often the 
measures in the latter stages take place without being triggered by a specific and imminent 
threat, although often mitigation measures follow catastrophic events. In the emergency 
response stage, decisions and actions are taken and implemented in a much shorter timeframe. 
At the same time, decision makers and rescue workers are dealing with information shortage, 
uncertainty (Comes et al. 2011), and coordination between different agencies, organizations 
and not in the least the affected population (Van den Homberg et al. 2014).   
 
The following sections describe the decisions and actions made immediately prior to the impact 
of Hurricane Harvey and those taken after it reached the Houston region. Section 6.2 
(Evacuation) describes the complex interplay between formal evacuation decisions by the 
emergency management authorities and adoption of these instructions by local population and 
organizations. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 describe the formal response by federal organizations, e.g., 
FEMA, and the community-driven response, respectively. The latter concerns emergency 
response activities organized by groups without a formal mandate, such as community 
organizations, or ad-hoc volunteer initiatives. Finally, Section 6.5 describes the detrimental 
effect of viral hoaxes, often referred to as ‘Fake-news’, potentially stressing those affected by 
the hurricane and misleading emergency response. 
 
6 
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An interesting and recurring element throughout the emergency response stages and decision-
making processes is the coordination between different stakeholders and actors.  Emergency 
operations involve more (both government mandated and community-driven) organizations, 
citizens become more empowered through information access, and the overall complexity and 
connectivity is increasing. This signals a paradigm shift for this multi-actor system: emergency 
response is shifting from a ‘command-and-control’ approach towards a ‘coordinated network’.  
 
 
 
6.2. Evacuation 
In this paragraph we look at the decisions made for evacuation in greater Houston. A call for 
evacuation can be made in advance of the exposure based on forecasts, as well as after the 
exposure to save human life. Houston experienced an evacuation before. In 2005, a large 
scale, partly autonomous, evacuation took place in anticipation of hurricane Rita. This 
evacuation caused many people to loose their life -mainly due to accidents and health effects of 
a mass evacuation- although no flooding did occur after Rita. To get a better understanding 
about evacuation, we focus on the moment on which the decisions are made related to the 
threat, the information used for this decision as well as the costs and benefits 
Types of evacuation in greater Houston 
We distinguish different types of evacuation. Evacuation is defined as the process of alerting, 
warning, deciding, preparing, departing and (temporarily) holding people, animals, personal 
belongings and corporate stock and supplies from an unsafe location at a relatively safer 
location given the actual circumstances. Different types of evacuation are related to the moment 
of the onset of the evacuation and the flood, the destination (inside or outside the flood zone), 
and the relation with first responders.  
 
An evacuation can be advised (voluntary) or mandated (i.e. ordered). People can evacuate to 
multiple destinations such as dry floors in their own residences, public shelters or leave the 
threatened areas prior to a flood. People can also be informed about risk without an advice and 
start to act on their own, as was the case after Hurricane Rita. Houston then experienced a 
spontaneous evacuation. People outside the threatened area also evacuated and used road 
capacity, which therefore was not available for others (this is called a shadow evacuation). All 
decisions related to movement of people are considered as evacuation decisions. Also a 
decision not to evacuate, or to postpone an evacuation is considered as a decision. 
 
Although the data gathered during the Harvey Hackathon are not yet complete, it already 
showed that all abovementioned types of evacuation occurred during Harvey. Although 
preventive evacuation was not mandated or advised (voluntary), some people evacuated 
spontaneously as preventively. It is also clear that the evacuation decisions vary geographically 
based on the local circumstances. Based on current data, it is not possible to define a complete 
timeline of all evacuation decisions, more research is needed. However, several key moments 
in the decision making process for evacuation in greater Houston during Harvey can be stated. 
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Figure 6.3. Different types of evacuation (Kolen, 2013) (Image courtesy of Bas Kolen) 
 
Key moments for evacuation in Greater Houston during Harvey 
Based on the hackathon a first analysis of the evacuation decisions during the Harvey event 
show that they were both were threat driven (based on forecasts prior to the onset of exposure 
to the wind and rainfall) and event driven (based on rainfall and use spillways to relief dams) 
related to multiple hazard layers (see also Figure 6.3). 
• Threat-driven response: The first hazard was the hurricane itself and its forecasted impact 
on greater Houston area (the strength of the wind, expected rainfall and storm surge).  
• Event-driven response: Further hazards were related to possible dam failure because of 
extreme rainfall filling up Addicks and Barker Reservoirs, and the release of water from the 
dams’ spillways. 
Threat driven response  
The first decision about evacuation of the great Houston Area was to not evacuate preventively 
(because of the hurricane itself). Houston mayor Sylvester Turner decided instead to inform 
people about the threats and advised them to shelter at home and prepare themselves. These 
decisions were based on the forecasted path of Harvey and the potential impact. At the time of 
the decision to advise sheltering at home and not to evacuate preventively, the expected rainfall 
was 400-800 mm of rain. There were no estimations about the possible impact for loss of life 
given this amount of rainfall found yet. The mayor stated that the consequences of preventive 
evacuation of 6,5 million people would be enormous and would put people at higher risk than 
when they would remain at home (and prepare themselves). He referred to the evacuation of 3 
million people prior to hurricane Rita in 2005, which resulted in about 100 fatalities.  
However, some smaller cities still decided to call mandatory evacuations (e.g.; Missouri City, 
Bay City, Sugarland, Rosenberg, Simonton). 
Event driven response 
However, during the event some parts of Houston were still ordered to evacuate. These second 
order decisions for evacuation were based on the actual precipitation and the release of water 
of reservoirs by spillways to reduce the probability of dam failure. For example McDade Estates 
was under mandatory evacuation after officials made the decision to release water from Lake 
Conroe. Also for other areas evacuation was mandatory or recommended. During the Harvey 
Hackathon, no information was found about the costs (of the evacuation decision) and benefits 
(possible reduction of damage and loss of life in case of a flood) and the prior probability of 
flooding of the flood prone area, prior to the arrival of Hurricane Harvey. More detailed analyses 
about these variables can offer a better understanding about decision-making and how 
evacuation decisions can be related to the risk based approach.  
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The people who were exposed to the floods had to be rescued (by emergency workers), to 
escape (by themselves or with help from other citizens), or to wait until the water was gone. A 
first review of the acquired data shows examples of all of these. More data are needed to get an 
overview of the number of people rescued by emergency services or by other citizens as the 
required means (as the amount of boats, firemen etc.) to save them. Also in multiple areas the 
water level declined so quickly that people did not have to escape or be rescued. 
 
 
  
Figure 6.4. Texas National Guardsmen rescue a resident by boat during flooding caused by Hurricane 
Harvey in Houston, Aug. 27, 2017. (Courtesy of Army National Guard; photo by Lt. Zachary West ). 
  
 
Evacuation response and individual choices 
Evacuation decisions can also be considered as symbols. The decisions made by authorities 
are not always fully responded to, as even in case of a mandatory evacuation some people will 
not evacuate. This was also the case in Houston. In case of large-scale events like Harvey, it is 
impossible for authorities to check all houses and force people to evacuate. Evacuation 
decisions by authorities therefore have a strong symbolic value to encourage people to act (and 
most people will do so). However, each individual makes their own decision how to prepare 
depending on their own values, circumstances and information at hand.  
Parts of this information can also come from unexpected or unconventional sources. For 
example from The Waffle House, a fast food company that tries to be open during storms as 
long as possible. When they close (code red), the situation is considered really bad. In general, 
other businesses, organizations and people act sooner. Figure 6.5 shows the ‘storm’s severity 
index’ used by the Waffle House and their locations that were closed during Hurricane Harvey; 
seemingly even for FEMA an indication of the gravity of the event. 
During Harvey, a wide variety of response measures by the government, people and 
businesses could be seen in the timeline of the event we compiled in the Harvey Hackathon. 
People were not only rescued by rescue workers, but in many cases by fellow-citizens as well.  
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Figure 6.5. Example of twitter message by ‘The Waffle House’ and the index (Image courtesy of Twitter 
source) 
Future research needs  
The forecasts and response to Harvey can contribute to a better understanding of evacuation, 
and to improve the preparation for evacuation. More fact finding has to be done about the 
timeline of decisions and geographical distribution. Also a better understanding of the official 
information about probabilities, costs and benefits of evacuation is needed.  
 
Future lines of research can be defined to define optimal evacuation strategies based on a risk 
based approach and taking uncertainties of forecast and consequences into account. Using the 
risk based approach, cost benefit analyses decision support instruments can be used to support 
the call for evacuation. These lines of research makes the assumptions made by the Mayor of 
Houston explicit and reduces the meaning making in the aftermath. This line of research also 
puts the risk as the cornerstone of emergency planning which gives the opportunity to define the 
effectiveness of better planning, exercises, information systems etc. 
 
Also for the Netherlands a better understanding of the call for evacuation is important, as well 
as the way the decision are communicated and result in response of the public and emergency 
services. Although experiences in the U.S. cannot directly be copied to the Netherlands 
because of different cultures, still many lessons can be learned from research on cases like 
Harvey.  
 
 
6.3. Emergency Response 
In the Daily Flash of August 18, 2017, the European Response and Coordination Center 
(ERCC) managed by Directorate  General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid 
(DG ECHO), identifies Tropical Cyclone Harvey as one of the weather events that are being 
monitored, mentioning the storm warnings for the Windward Island and eastern Caribbean Sea. 
While the storm had been tracked by several meteorological institutes (including the NOAA), the 
storm then also appeared on the radar of emergency response organizations, including the 
CDEMA (Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency). These emergency 
management authorities start implementing various emergency protocols, and issuing severe 
storm warnings. Different actions were undertaken, such as pre-emptive evacuations, pre-
positioning of emergency response resources, and activating civil protection measures. In the 
Daily Flash of 28 August 2017 (see Figure 6.7), the ERCC reports that Harvey had made 
landfall in the United States the day before and mentions the disaster proclamation for the state 
of Texas and the activation of the FEMA response. The ERCC continued tracking  
Hurricane Harvey and updated the situation in their Daily Flash, including maps of the 
hurricane’s path. 
 
 
TU Delft - Hurricane Harvey Report            Page 66 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7. ERCC Daily Flash August 28, 2017 (Retrieved 1-10-2017) 
 
Following the disaster declaration for the state of Texas by President Trump, the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
started to act as the federal coordinating body for emergency response. FEMA in turn activated 
several other mechanisms at both the national level (National Response Coordination Center in 
Washington D.C.) and in the affected region (Regional Response Coordination Center in 
Denton). These coordinating mechanisms supported individual states in implementing a range 
of emergency preparedness measures. The measures included information to the population 
through weather alerts, information on evacuation shelters, and safety tips in multiple 
languages.  
 
Aside from communicating to the public, the emergency response organizations also 
prepositioned teams and resources, including Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMAT) 
at the emergency operations centers. Throughout the response to Hurricane Harvey over 15 
other government (federal or state) agencies have been involved, detailed list of these 
organizations and their involvement in the response is included below. In addition to these 
formal, governmental organizations, the American Red Cross and another 300 voluntary 
organizations were mobilized. The amount and size of these organizations, each with their own 
mandates, expertise, resources, procedures and structures contributed to the complexity of the 
response and challenges in coordination (Table 6.1) and (Howitt & Leonard, 30 August 2017). 
As of September 22, 2017, over 30,000 Federal employees had been active in response and 
over 122,000 rescues were conducted (Figure 6.8). 
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Table 6.1. Historic Disaster Response to Hurricane Harvey in Texas  
FEMA News release  HQ-17-133 (d.d. 22 September 2017) 
Response organization Response activities 
Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) 
FEMA assigned 28 Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams from across the nation 
to deploy to Texas to assist state and local agencies with the lifesaving mission. The 
teams rescued 6,453 people and 237 animals, using boats and high-water trucks. 
Search and rescue efforts involved USAR, National Parks Service, U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service, Customs and Border Patrol and the Department of Defense. 
 
FEMA supplied 3 million meals, 3 million liters of water, 9,900 blankets, 8,840 cots 
and 10,300 hygiene kits to the state for distribution to survivors. FEMA quickly 
provided $186 million in Public Assistance funding to reimburse local and state 
agencies for the cost of emergency protective measures and debris removal. FEMA 
deployed teams of specialists to neighborhoods and disaster recovery centers to 
help Texans with registration and questions about disaster assistance. FEMA 
coordinated National Business Emergency Operations Center calls among 150 
private sector partners working on disaster response, worked with social media 
companies to share disaster information and assisted cell service companies in 
providing charging stations for disaster survivors. 
Coast Guard The Coast Guard deployed 2,060 personnel, 50 aircraft, 75 boats and 29 cutters, 
rescuing 11,022 people and 1,384 pets 
 
The Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) 
HHS deployed more than 1,110 personnel with medical equipment and supplies. 
Personnel provided medical care to 5,359 patients and conducted 60 shelter 
assessments. The department established medical shelter and helped move Port 
Arthur residents who had been living in floodwater-contaminated houses and 
apartments to temporary housing at the Bob Bowers Civic Center. 
 
U.S. Geological 
Survey (USGS) and National 
Weather Service (NWS) 
USGS scientists deployed to the coast to help the NWS forecast storm surge and 
beach erosion, then worked through Harvey’s landfall to keep the NWS informed of 
real-time flooding. After the floodwaters receded, USGS scientists collected more 
than 1,500 high-water marks to help develop future flood maps 
Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) 
HUD contacted all 61 public housing authorities in the disaster area to assess 
damage and to identify unoccupied units that could be made available to HUD-
assisted and other survivors. Those authorities manage 91 public housing 
developments that serve 200,000 families. HUD did the same assessment with its 
454 FHA-insured apartment complexes, comprising 50,000 units, of which 20,000 
had direct HUD rental assistance. HUD also canvassed the four-state area 
surrounding the disaster for available public housing and multifamily housing units. 
 
U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (USACE) 
USACE, deploying 390 personnel, worked with local and state agencies and the 
Coast Guard to clear navigation channels, allowing critical ports to resume 
operations. Engineers performed generator inspections and installations to provide 
temporary emergency power at critical locations and provided technical assistance 
for debris, temporary housing and commodities missions. 
 
Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and Texas 
Commission on 
Environmental Quality 
(TCEQ) 
EPA, working with TECQ, completed 625 drinking water assessments and 441 waste 
water assessments. The agency conducted assessments of 43 Superfund sites and 
recovered 517 containers of unidentified, potentially hazardous material. 
 
Department of Energy (DoE) DOE supported the Texas Division of Emergency Management and utility companies 
in efforts to restore power to more than 300,000 customers. Utility companies 
responded in a coordinated effort, activating their mutual support networks and 
assigning more than 10,000 workers from at least 21 states to the response and 
recovery effort, including crews, line workers and support personnel. DOE worked 
with the EPA to issue waivers that allowed more fuel to go into the supply pipeline. 
Secretary Perry authorized release of 5.3 million barrels of crude oil from the 
Strategic Petroleum Reserve as a resource if needed. 
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Department of Defense (DoD) DoD supported more than 30 mission assignments from FEMA that included search 
and rescue, strategic airlift, transportation, evacuation, installations support, patient 
movement and logistics. As part of the search and rescue mission, U.S. Northern 
Command rescued nearly 3,000 people. 
 
U.S. Small Business 
Administration (SBA) 
SBA, working with the Texas Gulf Coast Small Business Development Center, 
opened five business recovery centers to provide a wide range of services to 
businesses impacted by the disaster. SBA extended the deferment for first payment 
from the standard five months to 11 months from the date the borrower signs the 
loan closing documents. SBA provided an automatic 12-month deferment of principal 
and interest payments for SBA-serviced business and disaster loans that were in 
regular servicing status on August 25 in the counties designated as federal disaster 
areas. 
 
Civil Air Patrol  The Civil Air Patrol conducted 270 flights with 32 aircraft to assist with emergency 
response. 
 
Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) 
USDA activated the Disaster Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program to provide 
food benefits to households that wouldn’t normally qualify, if they meet disaster 
income limits and have disaster-related expenses. Schools in hurricane-stricken 
areas were allowed to provide meals through the National School Lunch Program to 
all students free of charge through Sept. 30. Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service deployed 25 tons of pet food to affected areas and used helicopters to 
identify stranded livestock, assisting the Texas National Guard in dropping 210,000 
pounds of hay to 10,000 head of livestock. 
 
General Services 
Administration (GSA) 
GSA leased facilities to provide work sites for several thousand federal employees 
deployed to Texas, including a joint state/federal field office, area field offices and 
call centers. 
 
Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) 
CMS temporarily modified the Medicare, Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance 
Program to provide immediate relief to Texas disaster survivors. Specific attention is 
given to care for renal patients to ensure there are enough facilities to serve 
beneficiaries in need of dialysis. The agency is accepting requests from end stage 
renal disease suppliers to become a temporary Special Purpose Renal Dialysis 
Facility (SPRDF). 
 
Department of 
Transportation (DoT) 
DoT provided technical assistance, training and on-site damage assessments for 
state and local partners to begin returning transportation infrastructure to pre-storm 
conditions. The Federal Highway Administration activated or deployed 36 employees 
in the response effort. Staff provided assistance for emergency repairs under the 
Emergency Relief Program with an initial $25 million in quick-release funds. All major 
airports returned to normal operations by Sept. 6. Ports in Corpus Christi, Houston, 
Beaumont and Port Arthur were open with restrictions. Metropolitan Transit Authority 
of Harris County returned to limited service. As of Sept. 20, 191 damage inspection 
reports documented emergency repairs completed and permanent repairs to be 
completed. 
 
Texas Workforce 
Commission (TWC) 
TWC began taking unemployment insurance claims the day Hurricane Harvey made 
landfall. FEMA activated Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) for Texans 
whose employment was lost because of the disaster. The program is administered 
by the State of Texas. As of September 19, the commission processed 136,576 
unemployment insurance claims, of which 17,714 were under the DUA program. 
DUA call centers are operating seven days a week. 
 
American Red Cross (ARC) The ARC provided $45 million to more than 100,000 disaster survivors to help them 
with immediate needs. The Red Cross deployed more than 3,000 staff and 
volunteers, 171 emergency response vehicles, served 965,000 meals and 1 million 
snacks and operated shelters throughout the impacted counties. 
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Figure 6.8. Historic Disaster Response to Hurricane Harvey in Texas. FEMA News release HQ17-133 (22 
September 2017) 
 
These organizations jointly organized the emergency response for the affected areas. This 
response comprised of operational activities such as search and rescue, evacuations, and 
medical care. Furthermore, the response also covered the provisioning of relief items to the 
affected population such as food and water, emergency shelter equipment, and financial 
compensation. Figure 6.8 provides a brief overview of the provided aid by these organizations. 
It can be noted that the figure mentions over 300 volunteer organizations that supported the 
emergency operations. These non-governmental organizations contributed a large portion of the 
resources, both manpower and items, in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey. Not only their 
resources contributed to the emergency response; their local presence, familiarity with the 
region and access also ensured a more effective operation for the government mandated 
organizations. The coordination, integration and collaboration with formal response 
organizations are key factors in ensuring that these organizations jointly effectively deliver aid 
and emergency response, as illustrated by the remarks by Gail McGovern, CEO of the 
American Red Cross. 
Comparing Harvey emergency response to Katrina and Irma 
Harvey is not the first major hurricane to strike the United States, and over time the United 
States and its emergency response mechanisms have evolved. Partly through lessons learned 
from previous crisis response operations but also due to innovations (technological and 
otherwise) in the emergency response domain. However, integrating lessons learned often 
proves difficult for emergency response organizations for a variety of reasons including high 
staff turnover and disconnect between operational emergency response staff and those 
responsible for adapting policy (Donahue et al 2006, Birkland et al 2009).  
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To find comparable events, we have to consider the context. Hurricane Harvey and Hurricane 
Irma, making landfall in Florida a few days after Hurricane Harvey, are expected to be amongst 
the most costly natural disasters in U.S. history. We could compare Harvey and Irma with 
Katrina 2005, which was the most devastating hurricane in U.S. history. Moody's Analytics 
estimated economic cost of Hurricane Irma will be $64 billion to $92 billion; damage from 
Harvey is estimated $108 billion. Hurricane Katrina caused $160 billion damage in today`s 
dollars according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. These statistics help 
us to understand impacts of hurricanes in approximately the same context but in different 
timelines.  
They also tell us something about risk preparedness. FEMA director William Long noted that 
U.S. residents still are not prepared for disasters, which can also be concluded when comparing 
the immense damage costs of Harvey and Irma to those of Katrina. Long stated that there is ‘a 
long way to go’ in the U.S. overall disaster readiness. 
 
When looking at the response, it seems that FEMA has had better performance in Harvey 
response compared to Katrina. More than 1800 FEMA staff deployed two days after the landfall 
(August 27) increased to more than 32000 in nearly a week (September 4). On September 6, 
FEMA started officially to prepare for the Irma. However, when Irma made land fall on 
September 10, logistic problems emerged. The challenges mainly happened due to the size of 
Irma, spanning the entirety of Florida’s southern peninsula, not its strength nor lack of staff. 
Several of pre-positioned items could not be mobilized due to access constraints: Staff was 
ready but could not reach places where they were needed. 2650 FEMA staff was in Florida by 
September 14. Overall, comparing Harvey to Katrina, responders were mobilized more efficient 
and effective mainly because plans were in place before the hurricane struck. The main 
criticism for Katrina response was that U.S. officials did not have plans regarding how to 
respond, how to coordinate, and how to use skilled responders. Hence, several problems were 
experienced with respect to search and rescue, logistics, relief delivery, and also recovery. 
Furthermore, during Katrina, FEMA seemed almost unwilling to accept help from non-
government organizations. For example, the American Red Cross was not allowed into New 
Orleans following the disaster and was unable to supplement the government’s response. 
Several articles can be found that criticized Katrina response for lack of efficiency, 
effectiveness, and coordination which apparently improved a lot in Harvey and Irma response. 
For instance, number of rescued people in the aftermath of Harvey was more than 72000 while 
it was about 34000 in Katrina. 
 
Overall, one of the main differences between in the emergency response organizations between 
hurricane Katrina and Harvey is the approach towards the inclusion other organizations. As one 
of the key lessons from the Katrina response, the resulting policies emphasized the need to 
strengthen the network (Moynihan 2009). Throughout the response to Hurricane Harvey, both 
before and after the impact, the coordinating emergency management authorities (most notably 
FEMA) worked closely with other agencies, including state and local organizations as well as 
non-governmental, community or volunteer organizations. The shared information, close 
coordination and collaboration not only ensure more resources were available, but also used in 
a more coordination and effective manner. The Harvey response illustrates the importance for 
emergency management authorities to use an ‘open’ and networked approach in coordinating 
the emergency response efforts. 
 
 
6.4. Community Response 
Before, during and after a response, emergency management authorities are working closely 
with other government agencies as well as other organizations, including community initiatives 
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as illustrated above. The added benefit of working closely with different organizations is not only 
the enlarged pool of resources that can be deployed for the response, but also the access to 
local knowledge and expertise. Combined with the technological development that provide new 
communication options and support the self-organization of groups, communities are playing an 
increasingly important role in disaster response (Baharmand et al 2016). 
 
Communities play an important role in crises and disasters, because they are on-scene and 
very often the first to respond. According to the Red Cross World Disaster Report 2013 about 
90% of rescued victims are saved by the local community. Community members provide life-
saving support, have access to resources and provide local knowledge. As such, they are a key 
to effective disaster response, particularly if access restrictions delay professional responders or 
if resources are scarce. While communities have important capacities and capabilities, they also 
represent the most vulnerable among the actors involved in emergency response.  
 
While ad-hoc community efforts have always played a key role in disaster response, today more 
‘tools’ are available to not only facilitate easier connections but also enable a wider reach. 
Twitter and Facebook allow people to connect, form groups and plan, forming ad-hoc initiatives 
comprised by spontaneous, unbound (not affiliated to a formal organization) volunteers. 
However, this is a double-edged sword. While volunteers can complement the resources of 
professional responders with local resources and knowledge, they do not have the training, 
experience, tools or methods of professional responders (Meesters et al. 2016). For example, 
unsolicited donations can cause bottlenecks and hinder vital aid to reach its recipients. 
Spontaneous efforts usually will not follow any guidance or ethical standards, potentially leading 
to safety concerns (for both the affected population as those offering aid), privacy violations and 
inviting misuse. Additionally, due to their ad-hoc and unbound nature, integrating and aligning 
these community efforts with the formal response can be challenging.  
 
In order to improve the alignment and coordination, it is important to understand the 
motivations, modus operandi and (self-) organization of these community responses. Since 
there are many different initiatives, platforms, and groups it is difficult to get an overview of what 
has been initiated, by whom, when, where and why. To gather and analyze the various 
community initiatives, a task specifically on the community driven relief has been introduced at 
the Harvey hackathon (see Appendix A). The data gathered during the Harvey hackathon 
illustrates the scope, variety, and importance of the various community efforts. This community 
response is provided by a wide variety of stakeholders, ranging from private (commercial) 
sectors to local ad-hoc grassroots initiatives and from international volunteer groups to in-
country assistance. Equally, the aid provided covers a wide span ranging from financial 
contributions to physical relief items and from offering places to stay to remote mapping of the 
affected area.  
 
In the following paragraphs we introduce several of these researched initiatives to illustrate the 
scope, variety, and impact of the community efforts. Moreover, these examples serve to 
illustrate the important contribution these initiatives make to the overall emergency response, 
not only in the immediate rescue states, but throughout the relief and recovery stages. The 
section concludes by outlining the key challenges for emergency responders and the overall 
response to fully leverage the potential of community response while reducing the risks. Future 
research directions our outlined as well, that would support further improving the impact of 
community response, considering the ad-hoc, spontaneous nature of these efforts.  
Private sector contributions 
Several companies supported communities through in-cash or in-kind contributions. Most of 
these initiatives are directly linked to customers or employees, and as such they do not explicitly 
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follow the humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality (Stewart et al 2009). A common 
characteristic of the collected data is that information on contributions by important companies 
is often clearly provided by their marketing and communication offices. Because they are thus 
much easier to find and identify than more hidden local initiatives that are not linked to 
marketing, the data collection effort during the Harvey Hackathon may have been biased to 
over-emphasize private sector contributions. However while the aid from the private sector may 
not be fully altruistic, the private sector has made an important contribution to the emergency 
response and disaster relief efforts including in-kind assistance and donations.  
 
Relief aid 
Home Deport (a DYI chain) activated their Hurricane Command Center to support coastal 
communities in the path of the storm. The company ensured additional supplies were redirected 
towards the affected area. As far as food production firms are concerned, the yogurt company 
Chobani provided 300.000 food supply items for affected families. The products were 
transported from North Idaho and New York to Texas. 
 
Telecommunication 
The Telecommunication industry made important contributions. For example, on August 25th  
AT & T was on the ground to restore the service in order to support both professional 
emergency responders and communities. Several solutions were deployed, including vehicles 
able to recover cell services in a specific area. On August 26th (in Texas) and 28th (in 
Louisiana), the company started providing unlimited data, voice and text to prepaid customers in 
the affected areas. This service was kept until September 15th. Eventually, on August 29th a 
total amount of $ 350.000 were donated by the company for community aid. Similarly, on 
August 29th Verizon pledged 10 million US$ to fund the Harvey relief effort. More specifically, 
they relieved customers in the affected areas from prepaid data and talk charges. They also 
deployed cells on wheels to help the communication for the response effort and offered mobile 
chargers in shelters. 
 
Automotive industry 
Many automotive companies offered cash assistance to their clients. For instance, on August 
21st the Nissan Group of North America pledged support to Hurricane Harvey Relief and 
Recovery Efforts. The assistance included donations of $ 150.000, plus $ 100.000 matched 
employee contributions, truck donations, and payment extension programs for Nissan and 
Infiniti customers. In a similar way, on August 28th Toyota offered financial relief to customers 
affected by the Hurricane. Also Ford provided $ 3.5 million to fund, the so-called ‘Texas is 
Family Program package’.  
 
Other financial Donations  
On August 26th United Airlines granted up to 1000 extra miles to Mileage Plus members who 
decided to donate. The donations had to be provided through the United Airlines fundraising 
webpage. The financed organizations were the American Red Cross, AmeriCares, Airlink, and 
Operation USA. There were contributions also from the film and entertainment industry. As an 
example, the Day of Giving Telethon was an initiative organized by Disney to encourage people 
to donate to the American Red Cross.  
Sharing of resources and assistance  
In addition to the aid and relief provided by commercial and private organizations, many other 
organizations also supported the relief efforts. These organizations are not traditionally (purely) 
focused on emergency response but do leverage their network, resources, and expertise to 
support communities in need during and after disasters. Often these initiatives look to people 
and groups that are part of their organizations’ mandate and focal area. While these 
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organizations do not have a specific emergency management focus, to often do have pre-
existing structures, processes and trained or experienced volunteers, making it easier for both 
them and formal emergency response organizations to align their efforts and coordinate with 
each other. Examples of these non-profit organizations responding to Hurricane Harvey include:  
 
• The Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) offered support to the affected veterans, their 
families and other members of their organization.  
• Texas Muslims communities turned Mosques into shelters, where they offered food to 
evacuees, distributed hygiene items, and also helped in rescuing stranded Houston 
residents by boat.  
• The Houston Food Bank, a well-established food distribution charity, contributed by 
collecting donations from community members and distributing them.  
 
Additionally, new community initiatives and groups were formed in the wake of Hurricane 
Harvey. Volunteer and community ‘activist’ formed groups either based on their capacities, 
resources and abilities to support the emergency response and/or on identified gaps and needs 
in the emergency response operations. While these groups didn’t exist as non-profit or 
community initiatives prior to the hurricane, they quickly transformed their mandate to support 
the ongoing operations and the affected population.  
• A group of volunteers used five monster trucks to rescue victims of the floods in 
Houston. The group was formed by Josh James; he contacted people in his social 
network from the Dallas racetrack. The trucks helped emergency services staff to reach 
areas with severe flooding. The vehicles also pulled an army truck from the flood in the 
city of Houston (Copperfield).  
• The Houston Relief Hub, recruited volunteers and helped by collecting donations and 
providing victims with clothes, food and cleaning supplies. The Hub was located at a 
specific address within the city and volunteers could sign up for shifts or just go the 
office to help during the day. The organization also started helping communities 
affected by Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico, thanks to collaboration with the city of 
Houston.  
• The Adopt a family in Need: Hurricane Harvey Facebook group was set up in order to 
connect people who wanted to help (or ‘Angels’) with those in need. The goal was to 
coordinate a community-based relief effort. 
Grassroots Community Initiatives and Technology 
At the local community level, different groups spontaneously initiated response activities as 
illustrated by the last examples above. The formation and organizations of these groups are for 
a larger facilitated by modern information and communication technologies. For example, the 
Cajun Navy is an ad-hoc volunteering organization, which was started in Louisiana after 
Hurricane Katrina. The organization recruited volunteers who owned a boat or wanted to help 
logistically and coordinated the search and rescue of flooded residents in Houston. This effort 
was supported by a walkie-talkie mobile and web application called Zello (Figure 6.9). Zello 
enables the creation of publicly available radio-like channels. These were used to recruit 
volunteers, train them, and ultimately try to connect those willing to help with those in need. 
Several of these channels were established. The app gained around 6 million new users in a 
week after Harvey had hit and Hurricane Irma was approaching. However, this is not the first 
time that the app has been used during crises with a consequent spike in the number of users.  
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Figure 6.9. New communication channels for community relief coordination: the Zello App. From Zello’s 
Facebook page (https://www.facebook.com/ZelloMe/posts/1119029224863699) 
 
Additionally, the Nextdoor app was used for the same purpose as Zello. This app creates a 
private social network in the neighborhood. Whether a new user actually belongs to a 
neighborhood is checked with by verifying the address e.g. with a credit card. While usually, the 
app is used to seek recommendations for a babysitter, sell items, or report suspicious activity. 
However, during Harvey, tens of thousands of new users signed up, and the app had a more 
than 500 per cent increase in posts, replies, and alerts. 
 
This turn to technology is also linked to a failure of 911 communications lines (see §5.6). The 
need to communicate and the surge of requests were overwhelming the official authority’s 
capacity to manage and cope with individual requests. As such, an institutional void was 
created that stimulated self-organization and bottom-up efforts, and people turned to their 
neighbors instead of waiting for authorities to respond.  
Digital Response  
Even further leveraging the potential of modern information and communication technologies, is 
the so-called digital response. These digital responses remotely and digitally support the 
ongoing emergency response for example by providing information or technologies to facilitate 
the response, whether formal or community driven. Given the role of social media and ICT, it is 
not surprising that there was a multitude of crisis mapping efforts that aimed to support 
coordination through providing an overview of the situation. Including support from the 
European Union through providing satellite mapping 
 
Among these the Standby Task Force (SBTF) was activated to collect information by the U.S. 
Coast Guard to support the information gathering for Search and Rescue (e.g. location of 
victims) operations and pollution data from all available sources online. The Standby Task 
Force is a global organization of volunteers who operate online. It is also part of a wider network 
called Digital Humanitarian Network (DHN) which includes many other volunteering 
organizations. The DHN can be activated by formal Emergency management organization 
(such as FEMA) and its role consists in assigning specific tasks to competent volunteering 
organization under its umbrella. Volunteering organizations can subscribe to the DHN in order 
to be involved when something connected to their skills is required.  
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While the SBTF is maybe most prominent in crisis mapping, there is a broad range of initiatives 
that were mapping different aspects of needs or the response: Harvey Relief was a crowd-
sourced initiative to map needs as well as shelter locations. The Houston Chronicle provided a 
crowd-sourced map of road closures. Houston Shelters offered a functionality to find the closest 
shelter. Overall, at least 10 different initiatives have been identified to support emergency 
response operations and facilitate the provision disaster relief to the affected communities. 
 
All these services do provide valuable information that can guide people that urgently need to 
find assistance. However, the information presented is often of unclear origin, or validity, and 
there is no clear mechanism for information verification, updating, or monitoring (Streefkerk et al 
2014). Moreover, the increasing number of platforms, website and other digital communication 
methods make it increasingly difficult to maintain a comprehensive overview not only of the 
platform themselves but also maintain overall situational awareness based information being 
offered. While the platforms, and the services and information they offer make a valuable 
contribution to the formal response and to the affected population, the diversity and their 
disconnected nature make increases the risk of information and coordination fragmentation, 
actually reducing their own value.  
 
 
Figure 6.10. SBTF heat map  for Hurricane Harvey. 
 
Conclusions 
Through the Harvey Hackathon we were able to explore the informal Emergency Response 
efforts. These were initiated by the private sector, affected citizens, and volunteer and technical 
communities that engaged in the digital response. In part, the degree of self-organization can be 
explained by the institutional void: when 911 lines broke down, communities had no choice but 
turning to their neighbors. At the same time, the use of social media or private and public chat 
groups on Zello or Nextdoor also bears risks, such as privacy violations, safety issues or fake 
news (see §6.5). Private sector engagement is often leaning towards supporting specific 
population groups, typically customers or employees. Relying on the private sector and 
community response thus cannot ensure that the most vulnerable groups and minorities receive 
the impartial help they need.  
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Despite these objections, community response and spontaneous initiatives are a fundamental 
part of the modern-day disaster response. Communities bring a large amount of resources (in-
kind and relief items), capacities and capabilities (equipment and people) and expertise (local 
knowledge and skills) to the disaster response. Further supported by modern information and 
communication technologies, disaster response is no longer the sole responsibility of the 
government mandated emergency management agencies, nor are they able to apply a 
command and control approach. Rather collaboration needs to be formed between to 
emergency agencies and the community response. To fully leverage the potential of the 
community, a coordinated approach requires not only agility and flexibility from the emergency 
management authorities but most of all a paradigm shift from a command and control to a 
facilitating role.  
 
 
6.5. Communication: the effects of ‘Fake News’ 
Fake-news is defined as a type of yellow journalism or propaganda that consists of deliberate 
misinformation or hoaxes spread via traditional print and broadcast news media or online social 
media. Due to the political incidents in recent U.S election, the term ‘fake-news’ gained lots of 
attentions. However, it is neither a new phenomenon nor necessarily related to political 
concepts.  
 
Harvey hurricane’s fake-news didn’t have fatal consequences as far as we have been able to 
assess; yet it did stress out several social network users. Whereas an image of a shark in the 
streets of Houston going viral might be not directly harmful, other viral hoaxes during a crisis 
can lead to catastrophic results (Washington Post, 29 August 2017). Besides creating 
unnecessary   stress to people in an already stressful situation, this kind of news can degrade 
the value of social networks, shake financial markets, and even disrupt aid operations. 
Therefore, it is necessary to come up with a solution to overcome this malicious phenomenon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.11. (left) a Facebook post about fake-news of "flooding in Houston airport" and (right) a Facebook 
post about fake phone number of National Guard. 
 
At the Harvey Hackathon (see Appendix A), we looked at the social media, to acquire data on 
how people reacted to the fake-news in this crisis. More precisely, what we pursued in three, 
two-hour sessions, was collecting Facebook posts relevant to some pre-determined fake-news 
at the time of Harvey hurricane, and trying to detect hidden patterns among the collected data-
points. For collecting the data, an instruction sheet had been prepared and handed over to the 
participants. In this sheet very detailed procedure of data collection was explained.  
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In our sessions in Harvey Hackathon, we collected 127 data points. Each data point has the 
following structure: 
 
 
 
Because each data point has several properties, it can be represented in very different ways. 
For example, our data can be ranked based on the time of appearance on Facebook, or it can 
be placed on a map based on its location. 
 
For three reasons Facebook was chosen as the medium of studying fake-news. First of all, in 
Facebook users can react to the posts with six different emotions, while in other social networks 
“like” is the only way of showing emotion. Second, Facebook does not let the users to have 
access to the content of the posts through the regular API. 
 
After the hackathon, we started to analyze the collected data to look for hidden patterns and to 
shape hypotheses for further research. In a first preliminary evaluation, three patterns can be 
indicated: 
 
- Geographical boundaries 
The first thing that we found out was about the importance of geographical boundary in the 
spreading of rumours during the crisis. We saw most of the posts about determined fake-news 
coming from Texas itself. So, we developed the hypothesis “Crisis related fake-news propagate, 
mostly in the region of crisis’. 
 
- User’s reactions 
Our second insight was about the reaction of the users after revelation of a fake-news. We saw 
that users who react to these posts with extreme emotion (Love and Anger) are more interested 
in sharing the revelation news. So, we came up with the hypothesis of ‘Users in highly 
emotional conditions have more potential for fake-news correction’. If we can prove this 
hypothesis, a strategy for correcting the fake-news might have been discovered.  
- Network structure  
The third insight we got was about then structure of fake-news network. We observed only few 
number of fake-news items are shared by a significant number of people, and the rest are 
shared just a couple of times. In network science, this is exactly what we call it scale-free 
network. So, our hypothesis in this observation is ‘Rumour networks are scale-free’.  
 
The data from Harvey Hackathon created a useful first impression of fake-news behavior in 
social media. For further research, currently, we are collecting more labeled data to be able to 
study the accuracy of the first two proposed hypotheses. A short first Phyton script shows that 
around 5000 tweets focusing on Harvey’s fake-news were spread between August 17 and 
September 03, 2017. By a rough estimation based on earlier research experiences on this topic, 
we estimate that about half or two-thirds of these tweets appeared on Facebook. After finishing 
the data collection phase, we will form the network of fake-news to study the accuracy of the 
third hypothesis. Also, we are going to do some statistical analyses to see whether we can find 
other patterns in our dataset, such as cluster analyses of Twitter messages along the following 
axes: 
- Type of message (warning, amusement, etc.) 
- Level of fear (sentiment analysis) 
- Popularity (number of retweets) 
Ultimately this can become a base to develop insight in and strategies for handling fake-news 
consequences during a flood disaster The Netherlands.  
 
 
TU Delft - Hurricane Harvey Report            Page 78 
 
   
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Students and researchers collecting data at Harvey Hackathon,  
TU Delft Science Center, 13 September 2017.   
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Harvey Hackathon 
Data Collection Event  
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
September 13, 2017, the Harvey Team and an interdisciplinary group of professors and 
researchers from TU Delft, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Hogeschool Zeeland, Hogeschool 
Rotterdam, and IFV Institute for Physical Safety co-organized the Hurricane Harvey Hackathon. 
The aim was no to execute a 'competitive' hackathon as is usual, but rather to collectively and 
collaboratively work on various tasks that are centered around data regarding Hurricane 
Harvey. Throughout the day there were different data tasks participants could join; for example, 
collecting (searching) data, analyzing specific events or tracing satellite imagery across different 
topics related to Hurricane Harvey such as critical infrastructure, community response, flood 
defenses, etc. 
 
 
Figure 7.2. Harvey Hackathon at TU Delft Science Center, 13 September 2017 
 
Over 100 participants and topic-leaders from different institutes and studies collaborated during 
the day (Figure 7.3). The hackathon took place in the TU Delft Science Center from 9AM to 
5PM. By working in blocks, students could choose to work on a new subject every 2 hours; or 
stay put at a subject if they were very interested (for topics, goals, and student tasks, see 
Appendix A). During each 2-hour block, staff from the various participating institutes provided 
two 10-minute presentations; either about the topic at hand in the hackathon or on related 
relevant topics. These short breaks were highly appreciated by students and colleagues alike, 
by providing a wide multidisciplinary overview. Moreover, they resulted in several new networks 
for future collaboration, which often overarched disciplines and institutes. 
7 
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Figure 7.3. Participant’s backgrounds (top) and affiliations (bottom) 
 
 
7.2 Why Hurricane Harvey? 
At the time, several other natural disasters were happening, amongst others massive flooding in 
Asia and hurricane Irma in the Caribbean and Florida. The choice to collect data on Hurricane 
Harvey was made for multiple reasons. First the Harvey and the Houston area provided a lot of 
data that could be searched. Since Harvey struck a highly developed region, where already a lot 
information was available, from either the government or research institutes, the choice for 
Harvey ensured there was enough ‘material’ (data) to work with.  
 
Secondly, the data collected from Harvey in this context can be generalized and applied to 
analyze other hurricane disasters. Harvey is a good case to get an idea of impact, initial 
response and risks. From this we can draw lessons for future scenarios. This is in part due to 
the high availability of information and pre-existing knowledge about the region and analytical 
possibilities, but also because the Houston has certain characteristics that are also found in 
other (potential) flooding scenario’s including dense urban environments, chemical industry and 
an extensive delta.  
 
Thirdly, the hurricane had passed Houston at the time of the hackathon, which enabled to 
include the impact of the hurricane, the effect of the emergency response and the 
consequences for relief and reconstruction.  
 
Finally, Hurricane Harvey and the Houston area served as a common ground of interest across 
different faculties and studies. As well as outside the university through the long-standing 
collaboration of TU Delft with Texas’ universities – Rice University, Houston and Texas A&M 
University, Galveston (see Textbox 1.1 in Chapter 1)– offers a base for immediate and relevant 
follow-up research projects, relevant for both the Netherlands and Texas. 
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7.3 Structure & organization of hackathon 
A structure with several time-slots for the various topics allowed spreading the topics throughout 
the day and gives participants various options to choose from. Added benefit is that this 
structure allows ad hoc changes, for example if a topic runs out of work, or turns out to be less 
or overly popular. Even more, if topic-leaders plan a 'break' for their topic, it gives them an 
opportunity to evaluate the first round and make changes for the next. 
 
Participants only had to bring was their laptop. It was easy for them to switch between tasks and 
find links to different spreadsheets, because most topic-leaders used one shared Google Drive 
for their topic. During the Hackathon we gave access to the drive to all students who joined 
during the day. The advantage is that there is only one link needed to share initially and one can 
link to other documents, files, instructions from there if needed. It is easier then every topic-
leader setting up their own collaboration environment. Also, Google Drive is an online 
environment, so no specific software needed for students. One issues to be aware of is the 
available storage space on the shared Google drive, especially if topic-leaders need to upload 
exceptionally large data in advance. However, a business account was used to ensure enough 
storage was available. Furthermore, throughout the day, regular backups to other media were 
made to ensure no data would be lost. 
 
Task design 
As there was a broad range of topics, each topic-leader was asked to design their own tasks 
that the participants could contribute to, and that would be engaging and ‘fun’ for the 
participants. We specifically asked for tasks that would not only require retrieving data, but also 
require participants to do some analytical work on the retrieved data. This also ensures that 
participants ‘learn’ more about the topics and gain new insights and understanding.  
 
Next, topic leaders were asked to design so called ‘micro-tasks’ (derived from the crowd-
sourcing approach). These tasks should be small, easily repeatable tasks with clear 
instructions, for example following a ‘recipe’ or ‘how-to’ manual. Thus participants could work 
independently on their tasks and still contribute to overall topic. These micro-tasks need to be 
designed in a way that they do not require too much prior knowledge, experience or expertise.  
 
Finally, the topic-leaders were asked to support the communication of the hackathon by helping 
to spread the word and recruit participants. During the event, the topic leaders were encouraged 
to engage with the participants, not only discussing the tasks at hand, but also their relation to 
ongoing research; and ask about the interests of the participants, contributing to the overall 
inclusive ambiance of the event. Topic-leaders were also invited to give short presentations to 
enable interested participants ‘deeper dives’ in their respective topics. After the event we have 
asked topic-leaders to share their experience with the organizing team and others, and continue 
the collaboration with fellow researchers and students as well as contribute (some of) their 
finding to this report.  
 
Combining data and visualizing results  
In the preparations leading up to the hackathon the organizing team offered the topic-leaders 
three solutions for structuring the data collection / analysis in the task they provided to students. 
By employing one of these options it would become easier for participants to switch between 
tasks since there was only a limited amount of data structures and formats in use. It also 
enabled a direct feedback to the participants as they can see the result of their work immediate 
visualized. For the topic-leader making use of these systems, reduced the difficulties in setting 
up and maintaining a data-structure and tools since this was facilitated. It also enables an easier 
collation and combination of the data in later stages. Finally, the provided systems were setup in 
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a way that backups were to be made automatically reducing the risks for system failures and 
loss of data. It was up to the topic-leader to choose which one they wanted to use (or a 
combination) and how to integrate them in their task and instructions. However we encouraged 
all topic leaders to include spatial (lat/long) and temporal (date/time) information, so the data 
from the different topics could later be more easily combined.  
 
Option 1: Own Google Sheet 
The first and easiest option is to setup your own Google Spreadsheet. Using the shared Google 
Drive topic leaders could create one or more spreadsheets in their (topic) folder. The advantage 
of using Google Spreadsheet is that you multiple people could people work in the same 
document at the same time. And data-validation, formatting etc., could be used to make the 
spreadsheet look a certain way and 'force' participants to follow certain conventions. Optionally 
a Google Form could be used to enter data (although working together in a spreadsheet gives 
more a 'community feeling'). When using the Google Spreadsheet option, topic leaders were 
encouraged to add a time (date/time) and/or spatial (lat/long) element (column) so it could later 
be combined with other data. 
 
Option 2: Timeline 
For topics that had a stronger temporal element, the option to create timelines was offered 
e.g.; http://www.earthmapps.io/harvey.html. These timelines are filled from a Google 
Spreadsheet using a certain template. This template could be adapted to match the specific 
data needs of the task at hand and later be visualized in a timeline (Figure 7.4). The 
visualization is done through a web service developed by Knightlab: 
https://timeline.knightlab.com/. Since this timeline relies on a Google Spreadsheet the same 
advantages apply as in the previous option, although specific care has to be taken to follow the 
template and ensure data is entered in the correct format. The added advantage is the direct 
visualization of the results on a site that can be shared publicly.  
 
Option 3: Mapping 
The third option offered is best suited for tasks with a strong spatial component. This option 
offers a mapping solution, enabling participants to ‘draw’ point or polygons on maps and add 
data to them (Figure 7.5). This solution for example allows participants to trace buildings on 
satellite imagery and describe certain attributes (such as damage). This option uses Github as a 
data-store, providing backups and a version-history. The frontend (used by the participants) can 
be found here: http://geojson.io/. The advantage of this solution is the direct and (fairly) easy 
mapping and tracing on satellite imagery, providing direct visualizations and output. However, 
more instructions guidance is needed. 
 
 
 
 
TU Delft - Hurricane Harvey Report            Page 83 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4. Example output of a Timeline (provided by Knightlab) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5. Example of Mapping Output (geojson displayed on GitHub) 
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7.4 Conclusions 
Although the data gathered in the Hackathon are a promising base for further research, most of 
the data could be used only partly for this fact-finding report, as the set is still scattered and 
could not yet be collated. Nevertheless, all the data, materials, instructions and tools remain 
available to all participants and topic leaders to be freely used in their own work, projects and 
research.  
 
For future hackathon events, faster direct use of data can be achieved when (initially) a 
narrower scope for investigations is chosen. For example, focusing on a specific area of interest 
or more concise research-area (e.g.; in the Hurricane Harvey case a specific scope could have 
been the Barker & Addicks Dam area). Multiple topics can thus be clustered around this area, 
which will ensure more in-depth and connected results in faster manner, rather than more 
scattered points. It will also contribute to participants’ sense of significance from their effort and 
to be able to communicate some results to interested parties soon after the hackathon. 
 
Related, live feedback to the participants is critical to maintain interest, motivation and 
momentum. This feedback can be for example from the topic leaders providing personal 
encouragement. But screens showing live-updated maps and timelines would further support 
the engagement of the participants. Additionally, those could be shared publicly right after.  
 
From an educational perspective, the hackathon was successful. Experiences and feedback 
from students were very positive; e.g.; it gave them ‘a feeling I could do something valuable with 
what I study’ and they ‘loved the experience of working in multidisciplinary teams’. Students 
have indicated in the follow-up survey that they would like to be informed about future events as 
well as stay involved in some of the research topics, for example for their own thesis or continue 
to be involved in one of the ongoing research projects. The hackathon -as a ‘form of education’- 
provides a unique value to students. It provides direct interaction between research, practice 
and education in an open and hands-on manner. By participating, students learn to use various 
tools, gain knowledge and find new approaches themselves to leverage their skills to support 
and implement social relevant research.  
 
From a networking perspective, the hackathon was also successful. Experiences and feedback 
from participants on this issue were very positive; Researchers mentioned they met colleagues 
they ‘would’ve otherwise never met’ and even ‘made plans to co-write a journal article’ 
combining the topics they hosted at the hackathon. 
 
The event also proved interesting for the wider community in the Netherlands as the hackathon 
was covered by multiple media. Both Dutch national radio (NPO1 Nieuws & Co), regional 
television (Omroep West) have covered the hackathon. Additionally, websites of the 
participating organization also provided articles on the event on their websites: TUDelft, IFV and 
Delta (TUDelft magazine) and an interview on the TU Delft Facebook page. According to the TU 
Delft social media team the reach on twitter was 5124 impressions and a potential reach of 
415050 impressions (Figure 7.6). 
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Figure 7.6. Social media reach (Bereik = impressions; Gemiddeld bereik = Average impression; Aantal 
berichten = Number of messages; Potentieel bereik = Potential impression). 
 
 
In short, an event like this is worth repeating; it brings together students and researchers from 
different disciplines and methods in hands-on, open and motivating setting. While some 
improvements can be made to ensure a higher quality output of data, the approach of a 
collaborative hackathon seems to have struck a chord with many of the participants and topic 
leaders. Nevertheless, as there is unfortunately no shortage of disasters, a strategy is needed 
to determine when it is effective and meaningful to organize a hackathon. Organizing and 
participating in a hackathon requires a significant amount of effort and commitment, to be 
provided in a short time. Additionally, the interest enthusiasm for a hackathon may be lost when 
organized too often, as it very probably only works if it is not an ‘everyday’ activity. 
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Flooded street Houston, Texas, August 31, 2017 (Image courtesy: U.S. Marine Corps - Lance 
Cpl. Niles Lee) 
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.1. Main findings  
The following section describes the main findings of the fact-finding phase of the research 
conducted in response to Hurricane Harvey and its impacts in Houston and surrounding areas. 
The findings presented here are preliminary and are based on an analysis of the information 
available in the first weeks after the disaster.  
 
1. Harvey made landfall near Rockport, Texas on August 25, 2017 as a Category 4 hurricane 
with maximum sustained winds of approximately 200 km/hour. After landfall, Harvey moved 
slowly inland before moving back out over the Gulf of Mexico and ultimately making a 
second landfall near the Texas-Louisiana boarder. Harvey caused severe damages in 
coastal Texas due to extreme winds and storm surge, but will be go down in history for 
unprecedented rainfall totals and flood-related damages in southeast Texas. 
2. Harvey dropped substantial rainfall over the Houston a period of 6 days (August 25-31, 
2017). During this period, upwards of 760 mm with a maximum of 1244 mm of rain was 
recorded in Harris County. In some areas, 12-hour precipitation totals exceeded 531 mm. 
Across large portions of Harris County, rainfall totals exceeded the 1000-year return period.  
3. Harvey was an extreme event in terms of flooding. Harvey’s extreme rainfall resulted in all 
watersheds in the greater Houston area to overflow, with most of them reaching water 
levels never before recorded. Preliminary estimates based on water levels reported by 
HCFCD suggest that flood levels in many of Harris County watersheds exceeded the 500-
year event.  
4. Addicks and Barker Reservoirs, built in the 1940s to protect downtown Houston from 
flooding by storing rainfall-runoff, were opened on August 28 to prevent catastrophic 
damages to the dams and further flooding in upstream communities. While rainfall 
continued throughout August 29, and knowing that the water levels in Buffalo Bayou had 
already exceeded its banks, it is expected that the dam releases contributed to rising water 
levels in Buffalo Bayou. This exacerbated flooding in communities along the bayou, with an 
estimated 4,000 homes affected  
 
8 
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5. Harvey was an extreme event in terms of its damages. It is estimated from public and media 
sources that 119,000 homes were affected of which 800 were completely destroyed; 
500,000 cars were damaged; 24 storage tanks ruptured; 300,000 people were without 
power; and 78 fatalities occurred (69% due to drowning). In addition, 3 million barrels per 
day of refining capacity were down resulting in an increase in gas prices in $0.50 in Texas 
and $0.20 in New York. The two busiest Houston airports remained grounded for 5 days 
and more than 10,000 flights were cancelled. Texas Governor Greg Abbott estimated that 
the total damages from Harvey may ultimately exceed $150 billion, placing Harvey among 
the costliest tropical cyclones in U.S. history. 
6. Flooding from Harvey also raised awareness of the potential environmental damages that 
can cascade from tropical cyclones and extreme precipitation events. Numerous industrial 
and chemical facilities were affected by flooding. Most significantly, the Arkema facility in 
Crosby, Texas lost power (incl. its generators) resulting in explosions and release of toxic 
chemicals into the environment. Exxon Mobile was forced to shut down two facilities in 
Baytown, causing the release of more than 5.6 tons of chemicals. In addition, concerns over 
damages to superfund and other toxic waste sites were raised. In post-event evaluation, it 
was found that the cap protecting the San Jacinto Waste Pits was damaged and significant 
releases of dioxin into Galveston Bay had occurred.  
7. No large-scale mandatory evacuation was ordered during Harvey and many people were 
asked to ‘shelter in place’ (i.e., stay at home or at another safe location). However, it 
appeared that several evacuations were ordered for local areas during the event. For 
example, some communities downstream of Lake Conroe were evacuated because the 
Conroe Dam was at risk of failing; communities near the Brazos River were evacuated 
because of potential levee failures; and communities downstream of Addicks and Barker 
Reservoirs had to be evacuated because of controlled releases from the dams.  
8. During the event, rising waters trapped many people, which necessitated major rescue 
operations. The capacity of formal rescue organizations was exceeded and volunteers with 
boats or large trucks were asked to help conduct rescues. In total, more than 10,000 
rescues took place and it was estimated that upwards of 20,000 people needed to be 
housed in temporary shelters in Houston.  
9. Social media played an important role during the event, providing additional resources and 
information when official organizations reached capacity. For example, SOS calls made via 
twitter, social media, and other sources were gathered and filtered to determine whether 
rescues were in fact needed. Moreover, in the wake of the storm, social media was used to 
organized volunteer networks to help aid recovery (e.g., the ‘Muck Map’). It is important to 
note that in some cases messages distributed through social and regular media were 
incorrect, triggering unnecessary fear. One example is the incorrect report of a levee failure 
along the Brazos River near Columbia Lakes which prompted widespread evacuation. 
Water levels at this location never overtopped the levees.  
10. It became apparent during and after Harvey that development patterns in Houston and 
surrounding areas had contributed to increased flood risk. Sprawling, mono-functional 
development, characterized by vast swaths of impervious cover (e.g., pavement) have 
reduced infiltration capacity and increased runoff rates in the region, contributing to 
increased flood risk in older developments.  
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8.2. Future research 
Drawing from the main findings of this ‘fact finding’ report, directions and opportunities for 
further research are presented for the different disciplines involved in this investigation:  
 
With respect to hydrology:  
• to study the storm in terms of its rainfall intensities and corresponding return period and how 
these are influenced by its track and other storm characteristics; 
• to study the role of climate change, i.e., warmer temperatures in the Gulf, on hurricane 
intensity and/or frequencies along the coast;  
• to model flood flows and floodplains resulting from the storms extreme rainfall, taking in to 
account local aspects such as overflowing of bayous, overland flow, dam operation, 
interbasin transfers, and compound flooding (e.g., tide and surge). Models may be validated 
using field observations (e.g., 911 calls, flood marks on buildings, stopped clocks, power 
outages etc.);  
 
With respect to flood management:  
• to model damages and validate against observed damages (e.g., using pre- and post-aerial 
photos, satellite imagery and field observations) to get a complete and verified picture. Also 
including long term effects such as health and environmental effects and business losses;  
• to estimate pluvial flood risks and how these are influenced by local conditions such as 
reservoirs, interbasin transfers, and storm tide; 
• to study the impact of the dam operation in Addicks and Barker dams (and for example 
Lake Conroe), and opportunities to reduce potential damages during extreme events by 
optimizing dam operation; and possible human error under stress situations. 
• to investigate which interventions and strategies could effectively reduce flood risks in the 
region. 
 
With respect to damages and land use planning:  
• to perform a post-flood damage assessment assessing the various damage types, such as 
structural and economic damage to houses, infrastructures etc. Also, the longer term social 
and health impacts of floods need to be identified. 
• to investigate in more detail the cascading impacts (e.g. spills and releases due to Harvey) 
observed in industrial plants. This will provide a basis to mitigate the risks of these natech 
hazards in the future.  
• to create a systematic inventory of where the to create a systematic inventory of where the 
interplay between natural landscape and the built environment produces the most urgent 
challenges in the city’s lay out by mapping;  
• to identify ‘hot spots’ that require immediate adaptation and/or have the biggest potential to 
reduce flood risk at the scale of the metropolitan region; 
• to make an inventory of both stakeholders and discretionary powers to steer land use at 
these ‘hot spots’, and create local strategies with a large effect on the region’s flood risk 
challenge as a whole; 
• to investigate whether a comprehensive strategy that reduces flood risk at the scale of the 
entire metropolitan city is possible.  
 
With respect to evacuation and emergency response:  
• to define optimal evacuation strategies using a risk-based approach, taking uncertainties of 
forecast and consequences into account;  
• to develop decision support tools that can be used to support the call for evacuation and 
determine effectiveness of evacuation strategies, emergency response and planning; 
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• to study measures airports can take to better prepare and recover from storm disasters; 
• to study how information sharing influences coordination between professional responders, 
digital volunteers, affected populations and state authorities and providing an analysis of 
opportunities (e.g.; social media) and risks (e.g., fake news); 
• to analyze critical infrastructure interdependencies and develop measures to improve critical 
infrastructure resilience building on this understanding.   
• Facilitate the paradigm shift from a command and control approach in emergency response 
to a coordinated network, inclusive of informal response and community-driven efforts. 
 
Understanding these issues will provide a knowledge base for establishing a coordinated and 
comprehensive strategy to reduce flood risk for the region.  
 
 
8.3. Lessons learned for the Netherlands  
Both the Netherlands and the Houston region are at risk of various forms of flooding: coastal, 
river and pluvial floods and their combinations. Over time, both regions have developed 
strategies and organizational forms to deal with the various flood hazards. 
Relevance for The Netherlands 
Efforts in the Netherlands over the past decades have largely focused on developing and 
maintaining large infrastructure to deal with coastal flooding from the North Sea and river 
flooding from the river Rhine. Over the last years pluvial flooding due to (local) heavy rainfall is 
gaining attention. It seems that severe rainfall events are increasingly occurring in the 
Netherlands For example, in 2017 and 2016, when mobile pumps had to be used in order to 
remove excess water from cellars, streets and tunnels in The Hague. Rainfall intensities in 
Texas are much higher than in the Netherlands. As extreme events such as Harvey are very 
rare, they are also important opportunities to learn. 
 
Texas is a test-bed for local best practices of how to deal with extreme levels of rainfall. Most 
notably, it can provide a test-bed for the study of robust structures that can withstand a certain 
amount of street-level flooding, or how to include policies for planning, land use and emergency 
management in the (re)development of Dutch cities. An inventory of these practices can inspire 
Dutch policy. To stimulate further debate and exploration a number of lessons learned have 
been formulated in the next section. 
Lessons learned 
Although flood management in the Netherlands and Houston differ (see §3.6), a number of 
lessons for the Netherlands can be formulated based on the findings in this report. These 
lessons are categorized according to the three layers in the multi-layer safety concept. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Multi-Layer Safety; from bottom to top: 1) prevention; 2) land use planning; 3) evacuation and 
emergency response. (Figure courtesy of Rijkswaterstaat) 
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Layer 1: Prevention of Extreme Events 
The first layer focuses on prevention against floods using civil infrastructure such as canals, 
dams and levees. Typically, the capacity of these systems is determined using a design flood 
(e.g. rainfall intensity, river discharge or water level) that has a certain probability of 
exceedance. 
 
Lesson 1: Harvey demonstrated that extreme events that exceed the design flood do occur. In 
parts of the region more than 1500mm rainfall fell and the estimated return period exceeded 
more than 1000 years, i.e. much higher than the design standard of 100 years. A lesson is to 
take into account the performance for “higher than the design flood” events in the design and 
management of water infrastructure. Where possible, the design can be adapted in such a way 
that sudden and catastrophic failure is prevented and thus made be more robust.  
 
Lesson 2: In general, the post-Harvey analysis highlighted that he safety standards associated 
with many of Houston’s infrastructure projects has not yet been determined. In fact, flooding 
from previous events (e.g., Memorial and Tax Day floods) indicated that much of the existing 
system is not able to handle precipitation events smaller than the 100-year, the volume used to 
drive flood policy in the U.S.. Although the water infrastructure in the Netherlands is 
substantially different and has to meet higher safety standards, it also appears that a large 
portion of the Dutch infrastructure is insufficiently safe according to current standards. For 
example, the latest safety assessment highlighted that this was the case for one third of the 
primary flood defenses. In addition, there is no national assessment and overview of the flood 
risks due to heavy rainfall. 
Layer 2: Land Use Planning 
The second layer concerns the impacts of floods and land use planning. The following lessons 
for the Netherlands can be learned from Harvey. 
 
Lesson 3: Many chemical and industrial plants were affected by flooding during Hurricane 
Harvey, resulting in spills and releases into the environment. In the Netherlands, similar 
cascading impacts could occur, for example for chemical facilities in unembanked areas in the 
greater Rotterdam area. In the Netherlands, similar cascading impacts could occur, for example 
for chemical facilities in unembanked areas in the greater Rotterdam area.. 
 
Lesson 4: A (lack of) comprehensive land use planning has increased flood risk in Houston. 
While the Netherlands mainly relies on prevention for riverine and coastal flooding, there is poor 
insight in the relationship between land use planning and pluvial flood risk (i.e., rainfall-induced 
flooding). An important question, both for the Netherlands and Houston, is the role that land use 
planning and interventions in the built environment play in reducing pluvial flood risks. 
 
Although the Netherlands’ possesses a comprehensive set of land use controls, its planning 
system is yet minimally geared to reduce damages to structures resulting from severe rainfall 
events. The above-mentioned inventory of best practices from Texas can inspire (integrated) 
land use policies in the Dutch planning system, contributing to a more flood-resilient urban 
fabric in the Netherlands.  
Layer 3: Evacuation and emergency response 
The third layer concerns the management of a disaster happening. The following lessons for the 
Netherlands can be learned from Harvey. 
 
Lesson 5: To evacuate or not? During Hurricane Harvey, emergency managers decided not to 
order a mandatory evacuation. If a severe flood were to take place in the Netherlands, it would 
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be very difficult to evacuate the millions of people living in South Holland, as road capacity is 
insufficient and lead-time is limited. Thus, it is important to gain a better understanding of the 
factor leading to a decision to call for evacuation, as well as the way in which this decision is 
communicated and the response of the public and emergency services to the call. Although 
experiences in the U.S. cannot directly be copied to the Netherlands because of differences in 
the physical systems and organizational culture, there are still lessons to be learned from 
Harvey. Examples include the decisions regarding targeted evacuations of high-risk areas and 
local resources for sheltering-in-place.  
 
Lesson 6: Tens of thousands of people were located in the floodwaters during Harvey and had 
to be rescued. The capacity of professional rescue organizations (FEMA, Coast Guard) was 
insufficient to meet these demands and a large “navy” of volunteers was required to assist. 
Given the expected scale of flooding in the Netherlands (100,000’s of people potentially 
affected) it can be predicted that in case of a flood disaster large-scale rescue operations will be 
necessary for which emergency services are currently not fully prepared.  
 
Lesson 7: The response to Hurricane Harvey was coordinated by FEMA. However, the 
breakdown of transportation infrastructures and communication lines along with the sheer 
magnitude of the response (see above) created an institutional void at local level, which was 
largely filled by grass-roots initiatives and volunteers. These local initiatives, however, do 
typically not follow any code of conduct or guidance – and thus there are no mechanisms to 
ensure that standards such as neutrality or impartiality are respected, that data is handled 
responsibly, that information is correct and not manipulated, and that resources and tasks are 
managed in an efficient way. Therefore, partnerships and preparedness of minimum standards 
and guidance that enables the emergent volunteer communities to support the response will 
need to be developed.    
 
Lesson 8: Infrastructures are interdependent. Healthcare systems fail without power, and 
emergency services depend on functioning 911 (TX)/112 (NL) lines. However, critical 
infrastructure preparedness and analysis often relies on simplified models that study only 
individual sectors, such as transportation, or energy. Harvey demonstrated that the failure of 
high-risk infrastructure, such as chemical industry and refineries, can cause environmental 
pollution and have long term economic repercussions. Models and systems need to be 
developed that focus on cascading effects and the complex interplay in today’s socio-technical 
system.   
 
Lesson 9: Social media plays an increasingly important role in disaster response. However the 
use of social media by government agencies is often limited to ‘broadcasting’ (sharing 1 
message to a large audience) or ‘analyzing’ (supporting the building of situational awareness). 
Social media is nevertheless also an ‘enabler’, it allows people to connect, organize and take 
action. Social media can enable crisis response organizations to be part of that conversation 
and create synergy between their own and the community efforts. This however requires active 
participating in the online dialogue. 
 
A more generic reflection focuses on the way various sources of information can be used to 
evaluate flood events and other calamities. There is a trend, nowadays in The Netherlands and 
elsewhere, to move from a physical-based modeling, to data-driven approaches (e.g. artificial 
intelligence), and hybrid combinations of both. The extensive monitoring of extreme events such 
as Hurricane Harvey helps to evaluate the performance and applicability of different types of 
modeling techniques and sources of information to come to a better characterization and 
understanding of these events. 
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8.4 Closure 
The findings put forward in this report demonstrate that flooding is a problem that has multiple 
(often local) drivers of both physical and social origin. To address the flood risks facing the 
greater Houston region and other deltas, a wide range of experts from multiple disciplines will 
be needed.  
 
This report aims to provide a preliminary knowledge basis that can be used to help begin to 
identify the issues facing flood risk management in Texas and future directions for flood risk 
reduction. Given the nature of flood risks in Texas, future studies will need to be undertaken to 
better define the risks associated with coastal, fluvial, and pluvial flooding in the region, and the 
effects of policy decisions on flood risk. 
 
In addition, this report demonstrates that lessons for the Netherlands can also be drawn from 
the flood challenges facing Texas, creating opportunities to further exchange local knowledge 
and expertise, and to work together develop solutions to reduce flood risks in both regions and 
in other flood-prone areas globally. 
 
 
. 
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Members of FEMA's Urban Search and Rescue Nebraska Task Force One comb a neighborhood for 
survivors impacted by flooding from Hurricane Harvey; Houston August 31, 2017 (Image courtesy of 
FEMA News Photo)  
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A Salvation Army food truck patrols a flood damaged neighborhood delivering free meals, Houston, TX 
(Image courtesy of FEMA News Photo) 
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t d
is
ru
pt
io
ns
 c
au
se
d 
by
 H
ar
ve
y 
in
 th
e 
H
ou
st
on
 a
re
a.
 T
he
 g
oa
l i
s 
to
 u
nd
er
st
an
d 
ro
le
 o
f a
irp
or
ts
 p
re
- a
nd
 p
os
t-d
is
as
te
r. 
 
 E
xp
lo
re
 w
ha
t f
ac
to
rs
 m
ay
 c
au
se
 a
irp
or
t 
cl
os
ur
es
, w
ha
t t
he
 e
ffe
ct
s 
ar
e 
on
 p
eo
pl
e 
an
d 
go
od
s,
 a
nd
 h
ow
 p
eo
pl
e 
an
d 
ai
rli
ne
s 
re
sp
on
d.
 
In
 a
dd
iti
on
, w
e 
w
ill
 lo
ok
 in
to
 h
ow
 fa
st
 a
n 
ai
rp
or
t 
ca
n 
be
 re
op
en
ed
, a
nd
 w
ha
t p
rio
rit
ie
s 
ar
e 
th
en
 
de
ci
de
d 
up
on
. 
 D
at
a 
ga
th
er
in
g,
 D
at
a 
as
se
ss
m
en
t /
 a
nn
ot
at
io
n 
 Ti
m
e 
lin
e 
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 Ta
bl
e 
Xc
: H
A
R
VE
Y 
H
A
C
K
A
TH
O
N
 –
 T
op
ic
s 
&
 S
tu
de
nt
 T
as
ks
 
  To
pi
c 
 
 Sh
or
t d
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
 
 G
oa
l 
 St
ud
en
t w
or
k 
 
 Ty
pe
 o
f t
as
k 
 O
ut
co
m
e 
 
 C
rit
ic
al
 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 
R
es
ili
en
ce
 
 Ti
na
 C
om
es
;  
TU
 D
el
ft 
TP
M
 –
 D
ep
t. 
M
ul
ti 
A
ct
or
 S
ys
te
m
s 
 R
es
ili
en
ce
 is
 o
fte
n 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 a
s 
cr
uc
ia
l f
or
 m
od
er
n 
so
ci
et
ie
s,
 b
ut
 it
 is
 
of
te
n 
un
cl
ea
r w
ha
t r
es
ili
en
ce
 a
ct
ua
lly
 
m
ea
ns
, o
r h
ow
 to
 g
o 
ab
ou
t m
ea
su
rin
g 
it.
 In
 th
is
 s
ho
rt 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n,
 I 
w
ill
 
di
sc
us
s 
po
ss
ib
le
 w
ay
s 
to
 tu
rn
 th
is
 
ab
st
ra
ct
 to
pi
c 
in
to
 m
or
e 
co
nc
re
te
 
de
ci
si
on
 s
up
po
rt.
 
 M
ea
su
rin
g 
di
sa
st
er
 re
si
lie
nc
e 
of
 c
rit
ic
al
 
in
fra
st
ru
ct
ur
es
:  
- d
ev
el
op
 a
 ti
m
el
in
e 
of
 c
rit
ic
al
 in
fra
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
fa
ilu
re
s 
an
d 
re
co
ve
ry
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 c
au
se
s 
(d
ire
ct
 / 
in
di
re
ct
)  
- t
hi
s 
co
nt
rib
ut
es
 to
 m
od
el
in
g 
th
e 
di
sa
st
er
 
re
si
lie
nc
e 
of
 C
Is
 in
 H
ou
st
on
, a
nd
 id
en
tif
y 
ke
y 
vu
ln
er
ab
ili
tie
s 
 Id
en
tif
y 
cr
iti
ca
l i
nf
ra
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
fa
ilu
re
s 
in
 te
rm
s 
of
 d
is
ru
pt
io
ns
 (t
im
e 
an
d 
se
rv
ic
e 
le
ve
l) 
an
d 
re
as
on
s 
fo
r d
is
ru
pt
io
n 
(d
ire
ct
 / 
in
di
re
ct
). 
C
or
e 
in
fra
st
ru
ct
ur
es
: t
ra
ns
po
rta
tio
n,
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n,
 
en
er
gy
 (p
os
si
bl
y 
ot
he
rs
 if
 th
er
e 
is
 in
te
re
st
). 
 
D
at
a 
so
ur
ce
s:
 o
ffi
ci
al
 re
po
rts
, m
ed
ia
 re
po
rts
, 
so
ci
al
 m
ed
ia
 
S
tru
ct
ur
ed
 e
xc
el
 s
he
et
 fo
r s
tu
de
nt
s 
w
ill
 b
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 
 
 D
at
a 
ga
th
er
in
g,
 D
at
a 
as
se
ss
m
en
t /
 a
nn
ot
at
io
n 
 Ti
m
e 
lin
e 
 Fa
ke
-n
ew
s 
in
 th
e 
cr
is
is
 
 Am
ir 
E
br
ah
im
i F
ar
d;
  
TU
 D
el
ft 
TP
M
 –
 D
ep
t. 
M
ul
ti 
A
ct
or
 S
ys
te
m
s 
 D
ur
in
g 
hu
rr
ic
an
e 
H
ar
ve
y,
 o
n 
se
ve
ra
l 
oc
ca
si
on
s 
fa
ke
-n
ew
s 
w
as
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
ed
  
 Th
e 
go
al
 is
 to
 c
ol
le
ct
 s
oc
ia
l n
et
w
or
k 
po
st
s 
(e
.g
. t
w
ee
ts
) a
bo
ut
 H
ar
ve
y 
hu
rr
ic
an
e 
fa
ke
-
ne
w
s 
an
d 
ta
g 
th
em
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
fo
ur
 
in
di
ca
to
rs
: (
i) 
at
tit
ud
e 
[c
on
fir
m
s 
or
 b
el
ie
ve
s 
/ 
de
ny
 o
r d
eb
un
k]
  
(ii
) s
ub
je
ct
 [f
un
ny
/a
la
rm
in
g/
fri
gh
te
ni
ng
/ …
]  
(ii
i) 
st
at
e 
[p
re
-r
ev
el
at
io
n 
/ p
os
t-r
ev
el
at
io
n]
 
(iv
) s
ou
rc
e 
[n
ew
s 
ag
en
ci
es
/v
er
ifi
ed
 re
po
rte
rs
 
/o
rd
in
ar
y 
pe
op
le
/…
]. 
A
t t
he
 e
nd
 it
 is
 
ex
pe
ct
ed
, a
 b
rie
f s
um
m
ar
y 
of
 c
ol
le
ct
ed
 d
at
a 
ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
ab
ov
e 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 is
 d
el
iv
er
ed
.  
 
 (i)
 d
at
a 
co
lle
ct
io
n:
 fo
r T
w
itt
er
, t
he
 e
as
ie
st
 w
ay
 
is
 to
 u
se
 it
s 
A
P
I, 
bu
t f
or
 In
st
ag
ra
m
 a
nd
 
Fa
ce
bo
ok
 th
e 
be
st
 w
ay
 is
 m
an
ua
l d
at
a 
co
lle
ct
io
n,
  
(ii
) T
ag
gi
ng
: A
lth
ou
gh
 w
ith
 M
L,
 a
ll 
th
os
e 
ta
sk
s 
ca
n 
be
 d
on
e 
au
to
m
at
ic
al
ly
 w
ith
 a
n 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 
ac
cu
ra
cy
, m
an
ua
l t
ag
gi
ng
 is
 m
or
e 
fa
vo
ra
bl
e.
 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e,
  
(ii
i) 
B
rie
f s
um
m
ar
y:
 u
si
ng
 E
xc
el
, G
oo
gl
e 
S
he
et
 
or
 o
th
er
 s
pr
ea
ds
he
et
 s
of
tw
ar
e 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 b
as
ic
 
st
at
s 
ab
ou
t e
ac
h 
in
di
ca
to
r i
n 
co
lle
ct
ed
 d
at
a.
 
 
 D
at
a 
ga
th
er
in
g,
 D
at
a 
as
se
ss
m
en
t /
 a
nn
ot
at
io
n,
 D
at
a 
an
al
ys
is
 
 Ti
m
e 
lin
e 
 Zo
ni
ng
 a
nd
 la
nd
 
us
e:
 
En
tit
ie
s 
&
 
Ju
ris
di
ct
io
ns
 
 N
ik
ki
 B
ra
nd
; 
TU
 D
el
ft,
 A
rc
hi
te
ct
ur
e;
 
D
ep
t. 
U
rb
an
is
m
 
 Te
xa
s 
is
 (i
n)
fa
m
ou
s 
fo
r n
ot
 w
an
tin
g 
to
 
re
gu
la
te
, a
nd
 n
ot
 im
pl
em
en
tin
g 
zo
ni
ng
 
as
 m
ea
ns
 to
 s
te
er
 la
nd
 u
se
. H
ow
ev
er
 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
ot
he
r m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
th
at
 
re
gu
la
te
. F
or
 c
er
ta
in
 p
ur
po
se
s 
sp
ec
ia
l 
en
tit
ie
s 
ar
e 
cr
ea
te
d,
 u
si
ng
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 
th
at
 lo
ok
s 
lik
e 
a 
pe
rm
it 
to
 s
el
f-r
eg
ul
at
e.
 
Q
ue
st
io
n 
is
 w
he
re
 th
ey
 h
av
e 
ju
ris
di
ct
io
n…
an
d 
ho
w
 m
an
y 
en
tit
ie
s 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
in
 p
ra
ct
ic
e.
 I 
ex
pe
ct
 th
at
 
so
m
e 
pl
ac
es
 h
av
e 
no
 e
nt
ity
 a
t a
ll…
an
d 
pe
rh
ap
s 
so
m
e 
ju
ris
di
ct
io
ns
 o
ve
rla
p 
ge
og
ra
ph
ic
al
ly
.  
 
 A
n 
ov
er
vi
ew
 o
f t
he
 g
eo
gr
ap
hi
c 
ju
ris
di
ct
io
ns
 
of
 lo
ca
l e
nt
iti
es
 th
at
 h
av
e 
po
w
er
s 
to
 s
te
er
 
la
nd
 u
se
 p
at
te
rn
s.
 W
e 
ca
n 
us
e 
th
is
 to
 s
ee
 
w
he
re
 th
er
e 
is
 c
ap
ac
ity
 to
 d
ea
l w
ith
 fl
oo
di
ng
 
ho
t s
po
ts
! A
nd
 w
he
re
 th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
on
e.
 
  
 Fi
nd
: -
 D
is
tri
ct
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
 (l
ik
e 
bu
si
ne
ss
 
di
st
ric
ts
, w
he
re
 lo
ca
l b
us
in
es
s 
ow
ne
rs
  b
an
d 
to
ge
th
er
 to
 s
el
f-r
eg
ul
at
e,
 o
r h
is
to
ric
al
 d
is
tri
ct
s)
. 
- R
es
id
en
tia
l s
ub
di
vi
si
on
s 
(m
os
tly
 o
ut
si
de
 o
f 
th
e 
ci
ty
’s
 p
ro
pe
r)
. 
- B
el
tw
ay
 B
us
in
es
s 
P
ar
k?
 
- M
un
ic
ip
al
 m
an
ag
em
en
t d
is
tri
ct
s 
(2
2 
fo
r 
su
re
!),
 k
no
w
n 
as
 M
M
D
s.
 
- M
un
ic
ip
al
 u
til
ity
 d
is
tri
ct
s,
 k
no
w
n 
as
 M
U
D
s 
– 
co
ul
d 
ov
er
la
p 
w
ith
 M
M
D
S
. 
- P
ub
lic
 p
riv
at
e 
pa
rtn
er
sh
ip
s,
 li
ke
 th
e 
on
e 
th
at
 
re
co
ns
tru
ct
ed
 B
uf
fa
lo
 B
ay
ou
  
- T
he
 ju
ris
di
ct
io
n 
of
 H
ou
st
on
 S
hi
p 
C
ha
nn
el
? 
 D
at
a 
ga
th
er
in
g 
 M
ap
 
 G
ov
er
na
nc
e 
re
si
lie
nc
e 
 Lu
ka
s 
P
ap
en
bo
rg
; 
H
og
es
ch
oo
l Z
ee
la
nd
, 
D
ep
t. 
R
es
ili
en
t D
el
ta
’s
 
 
 Th
e 
ai
m
 is
 to
 g
ai
n 
in
si
gh
ts
 a
bo
ut
 p
re
-
ar
ra
ng
ed
 U
S
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
re
si
lie
nc
e 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 a
nd
 s
tra
te
gi
es
 in
 th
e 
G
al
ve
st
on
 B
ay
 a
re
a,
 b
ef
or
e 
H
ar
ve
y 
an
d 
th
e 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 th
es
e 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 a
nd
 s
tra
te
gi
es
 d
ur
in
g 
H
ar
ve
y.
 
 M
or
e 
in
fo
 o
n 
un
de
rta
ke
n 
(s
tra
te
gi
c)
 U
S
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 re
si
lie
nc
e 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 in
 th
e 
G
al
ve
st
on
 B
ay
 a
re
a;
 in
cl
. f
lo
od
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n,
 
sp
at
ia
l a
da
pt
at
io
n 
an
d 
cr
is
is
 m
an
ag
em
en
t. 
 Th
e 
st
ud
en
ts
 s
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
do
cu
m
en
t p
ol
ic
ie
s 
an
d 
st
ra
te
gy
 p
la
ns
, r
ep
or
ts
 e
tc
. t
ha
t d
ea
l w
ith
 
th
e 
re
si
lie
nc
e 
of
 th
e 
G
al
ve
st
on
 B
ay
 a
re
a,
 
be
fo
re
 H
ar
ve
y 
an
d 
th
e 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 
th
es
e 
po
lic
ie
s,
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 a
nd
 s
tra
te
gi
es
 d
ur
in
g 
H
ar
ve
y.
 
 D
at
a 
ga
th
er
in
g,
 D
at
a 
as
se
ss
m
en
t 
Ti
m
e 
lin
e 
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 Ta
bl
e 
Xd
: H
A
R
VE
Y 
H
A
C
K
A
TH
O
N
 –
 T
op
ic
s 
&
 S
tu
de
nt
 T
as
ks
 
  To
pi
c 
 
 Sh
or
t d
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
 
 G
oa
l 
 St
ud
en
t w
or
k 
 
 Ty
pe
 o
f t
as
k 
 O
ut
co
m
e 
 
 In
su
ra
nc
e 
 M
at
th
ijs
 K
ok
, ,
  
TU
 D
el
ft,
 C
E
G
 –
 
H
yd
ra
ul
ic
 S
tru
ct
ur
es
 &
 
Fl
oo
d 
R
is
k 
 In
 a
 h
ur
ric
an
e 
lik
e 
H
ar
ve
y 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
di
ffe
re
nt
 ty
pe
s 
of
 d
am
ag
e,
 fo
r e
xa
m
pl
e 
da
m
ag
e 
du
e 
to
 w
in
d 
an
d 
da
m
ag
e 
du
e 
to
 fl
oo
ds
. T
he
re
 is
 n
ot
 a
 s
in
gl
e 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
or
 a
no
th
er
 c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 th
at
 c
ov
er
s 
al
l t
ho
se
 
da
m
ag
es
. 
 
 H
ar
ve
y 
ca
us
ed
 m
uc
h 
da
m
ag
e,
 in
 a
 lo
t o
f 
ec
on
om
ic
 s
ec
to
rs
. B
ut
 w
ho
 p
ai
d 
th
e 
da
m
ag
e?
 T
he
 in
di
vi
du
al
 c
iti
ze
n 
an
d 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 w
ho
 s
uf
fe
re
d 
th
e 
da
m
ag
e?
 O
r a
re
 
th
er
e 
so
m
e 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 li
ke
 in
su
ra
nc
e 
to
 
sh
ar
e 
th
e 
da
m
ag
e?
 
E
xp
lo
re
 th
e 
in
te
rn
et
 to
 d
is
co
ve
r i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n.
 T
he
 c
ha
lle
ng
e 
is
 to
 
di
sc
ov
er
 w
ha
t t
yp
es
 o
f i
ns
ur
an
ce
 p
ol
ic
ie
s 
th
er
e 
ar
e,
 a
nd
 h
ow
 it
 is
 d
iv
id
ed
 a
m
on
g 
th
e 
di
ffe
re
nt
 g
ro
up
s 
of
 p
eo
pl
e 
(fo
r e
xa
m
pl
e 
ric
h 
ve
rs
us
 th
e 
po
or
). 
 1.
 F
in
d 
FE
M
A
 in
su
ra
nc
e 
m
ap
s 
fo
r H
ou
st
on
. 
Th
es
e 
ar
e 
m
ap
s 
of
 F
E
M
A
: i
f y
ou
 a
re
 in
 th
e 
1/
10
0 
flo
od
pl
ai
n,
 th
en
 y
ou
 h
av
e 
to
 b
uy
 fl
oo
d 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
w
he
n 
yo
u 
ha
ve
 a
 m
or
tg
ag
e.
 F
in
d 
al
so
 o
th
er
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t i
ns
ur
an
ce
 o
f 
“H
ar
ve
y 
da
m
ag
e”
, a
nd
 p
re
m
iu
m
s.
   
2.
 D
is
as
te
r r
el
ie
f. 
O
fte
n,
 p
eo
pl
e 
(a
nd
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
?)
 a
re
 c
om
pe
ns
at
ed
 b
y 
lo
ca
l 
di
sa
st
er
 re
lie
f f
un
ds
. I
s 
th
er
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t 
th
es
e 
fu
nd
s 
ab
ou
t H
ar
ve
y?
 W
ho
 is
 p
ay
in
g 
th
es
e 
fu
nd
s?
  
Fi
nd
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 s
oc
ia
l m
ed
ia
 a
bo
ut
 (f
lo
od
 
an
d 
ot
he
r t
yp
es
 o
f) 
in
su
ra
nc
e,
 o
r o
th
er
 ty
pe
s 
of
 lo
ca
l o
r f
ed
er
al
 d
is
as
te
r r
el
ie
f o
f t
he
 d
am
ag
e 
3.
 C
rit
ic
al
 in
fra
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
(h
os
pi
ta
ls
, o
il 
an
d 
ga
s 
in
fra
st
ru
ct
ur
e,
 ta
p 
w
at
er
, r
oa
ds
, e
tc
): 
w
ho
 is
 
pa
yi
ng
 d
am
ag
e 
 
 D
at
a 
ga
th
er
in
g,
 D
at
a 
as
se
ss
m
en
t /
 a
nn
ot
at
io
n 
 O
ve
rv
ie
w
/ 
m
ap
 
 
